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Abstract 
 
QKD systems combine cryptographic primitives with quantum information theory 
to produce a theoretic unconditionally secure cryptographic key. However, real-world 
implementations of QKD systems are far from ideal and significantly differ from the 
theoretic model. Because of this, real-world QKD systems require additional practical 
considerations when implemented to achieve secure operations. In this thesis, a content 
analysis of the published literature is conducted to determine if established security and 
cryptographic standards and best practices are addressed in real world, practical QKD 
implementations. The research reveals that most published, real world QKD 
implementations do not take advantage of established security and cryptographic 
standards and best practices. Based upon an analysis of existing security and 
cryptographic standards and best practices, systems architecture methodology is used to 
make recommendations for how these standards can and should be applied to establish a 
practical, secure, QKD system framework.  
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SECURITY STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD) 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Classical cryptographic methods rely on the computing time necessary to solve 
difficult mathematical problems such as discrete logarithms and factoring large prime 
numbers to provide security. They work by ensuring the time cost verses benefit gained 
to break the algorithm does not make solving the problem feasible for an attacker [1]; 
however, increases in computer processing speeds over time have prompted newer and 
more sophisticated methods of encrypting and protecting data for purposes of information 
security.  
The past few decades, research has yielded a new technology called Quantum 
Key Distribution (QKD) which utilizes several quantum mechanics principles in 
conjunction with cryptographic primitives as a way to provide theoretically unconditional 
security. The appeal of QKD is driven by the unconditional security it provides despite 
any advances made in computing power or mathematics. As QKD becomes a more viable 
alternative to existing cryptographic technologies, researchers have sought to determine 
just how much security a QKD system provides through both mathematic and 
experimental rigor. While this research has produced a great deal of important 
discoveries for the future of QKD, very little has been published investigating whether 
systems meet existing security standards.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
To understand the security of a QKD system, an understanding of its fundamental 
principles is required. A QKD system claims to theoretically provide unconditional 
security by combining three key concepts. First, it utilizes a cryptographic primitive 
known as a one-time pad [2:10-12]. A one-time pad is a symmetric cryptographic 
algorithm that requires a random key the same length as the message to be encrypted and, 
provided the key is never reused, is the only information theoretically secure encryption 
primitive. Information theoretically secure means that it has been formally proven that 
knowing the cipher text message in no way gives information regarding the plain text [1]. 
Second, it employs a message authentication primitive which utilizes a fraction of the key 
in a Universal 2-Hash function [2:10-12]. Third, the principle that makes QKD a truly 
unique system is the key distribution primitive which relies on Quantum Information 
Theory that prevents bits sent on a quantum channel from being copied or intercepted 
without notice [2:10-12]. Ideally, when these three concepts are implemented in a QKD 
system, the message sent is secure. 
Unfortunately, while theoretical proofs hold great value in determining strengths 
and weaknesses of a system, the real world implementations very rarely meet ideal 
conditions. These non idealities often introduce vulnerabilities. Standards and processes 
are developed to govern implementation, address non-idealities and to determine whether 
a system meets security requirements. In the case of a system such as QKD where 
security is a main system function, it becomes absolutely essential to use security 
standard considerations when developing a baseline architecture. This research seeks to 
answer the following question: Does existing QKD research consider security standards? 
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Further, this research seeks to synthesize a prototypical QKD system utilizing systems 
architecture that incorporates industry security standards and best practices. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
This research surveys cryptographic and information technology security 
standards to examine their use to date in researching QKD and to suggest a starting 
framework for secure QKD design. It considers accepted practices from the standards 
community as well as systems engineering processes related to architectural development 
and definition to provide a baseline for consideration. Specifically, this thesis seeks to 
answer the following research questions: 
1) To what extent do published QKD systems meet security standards?  
2) Does systems architecture methodology provide a blueprint for future QKD 
development?  
1.4 Methodology 
This research will be conducted utilizing content analysis and will synthesize a 
prototypical QKD system using architectural definition. To support the stated objectives, 
a minimal systems engineering architecture will be built as an example of how an 
engineer may develop a QKD system baseline fulfilling system and security 
requirements. These requirements are based off the functional requirements of QKD, 
technical standards and user needs.  
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1.5 Assumptions and Limitations 
By virtue of the nascent technological nature of QKD as well as the methodology 
described above and in Ch 3, there are several limitations to this research.  
1) QKD systems are limited to hardware/software components that are currently 
available. For example, an ideal system requires a single photon generator to 
transmit bits using individual photons. In reality, single photon generators are not 
available for use and so another method, such as an attenuated weak laser pulse 
may be used instead. 
2) Systems do not function in isolation and design must include the system 
context and so any system presented here will be strictly a general baseline for 
consideration, not a complete model for validation.  
3) The methodology used in this research is limited by the availability of public 
 literature that addresses QKD implementation. Most research papers are 
 necessarily constricted by length and effectively focus on specific aspects of the 
 system rather than developing a coherent whole.  
4) The scope of this research is limited. As such, only 10 published papers and 
four industry standards were selected for review. An attempt was made to present 
a sampling of papers. Industry standards were selected based on applicability and 
generalness of use.  
1.6 Implications 
QKD public research to date has largely been focused on technology and theory 
development, not engineering rigor. As a result most available security investigations 
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have relied on either theoretical proofs or laboratory experiments. Although at the time of 
this research QKD standards requirements are in the process of being formalized 
[2,4,5,6,7], the newness of the technology has meant that production and use of QKD has 
outpaced these efforts. This thesis is an attempt to show that industry approaches applied 
with sufficient engineering rigor are a methodology that should be considered and to 
provide a foundational architecture for decision makers and future research and 
development. 
1.7 Preview 
This thesis is organized into 5 chapters. The introductory chapter discusses the 
system security considerations in terms technical standards and system architectural 
definition.  
• Ch 2 examines and classifies general QKD information, security 
standards, selected QKD literature and systems engineering architecture 
development. 
• Ch 3 describes the research methodology and introduces the Security 
Criteria Matrix and architectural development process used to conduct the 
research. 
• Ch 4 provides results of the Security Criteria Matrix and presents a 
proposed prototypical QKD architecture 
• Ch 5 draws conclusions regarding research objectives, answers the 
investigative questions and proposes future research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will provide a review of key literature applicable to QKD research. It 
will give a general overview of QKD development and discusses ten published papers 
that will be analyzed in Chapter 4. Additionally it will review the four IT security 
standards that will be addressed in Chapter 4: Department of Defense Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria [18], Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation[19], Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules[20], and the five 
ETSI documents [2,4,5,6,7]. Finally, this chapter will provide an overview of DoDAF 
v2.0 architecture guidelines [22]. 
2.2 Description/Background 
The birth of quantum cryptography was a paper on conjugate coding by Stephen 
Wiesner in the late 1960’s [33]. Wiesner postulated how quantum mechanics could be 
used to produce bank notes unable to be counterfeited. His research was mostly 
disregarded until Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard discovered how to combine 
Wiesner’s ideas with public key cryptography [34]. Shortly after, the real breakthrough 
was the realization that photons could be used to transmit information [9:2]. Eventually, 
this realization lead to a paper published in 1984 which put forth the now well known 
BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [8]. 
In the QKD protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984, single photons 
are polarized in one of four potential orientations using two possible bases. The 
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polarization of the photon is assigned based on the desired bit and basis to be sent. The 
process depicted in Figure 1 is: 
1. Alice randomly selects a bit and basis and polarizes photons accordingly.  
2. Alice sends the polarized photons to Bob.  
3. Bob receives polarized photons through his own randomly chosen basis 
4. Alice and Bob then communicate via public channel to reveal which basis 
they selected for each photon. Photons where matching bases were chosen are kept; 
photons where bases did not match are ignored.  
5. Alice and Bob then perform error correction/verification and in an ideal 
system what they have left is a secure key [8]. 
 
 
1101Remaining Shared Secret Bits
OUTCOME
OKOKAlice Confirms Them
01
Bob Reveals Some Key Bits at 
Random
101011
Presumably Shared Information (if 
no eavesdropping)
OKOKOKOKOKOK
Alice Says Which Bases Were 
Correct
RDDDRRDDRDR
Bob Reports Bases of Received 
Bits
PUBLIC DISCUSSION
10111000111Bits as Received by Bob
RDDDDRDRDDRRDDRRandom Receiving Bases
Photons Alice Sends
RDDDRDDRRRRRDRDRandom Sending Bases
100110100110110Alice's Random Bits
QUANTUM TRANSMISSION
 
Figure 1. BB84 Protocol [8] 
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Since then, experimental quantum cryptography has continued to progress. 
Eventually, it was postulated that by utilizing a quantum distribution system, combined 
with a symmetric key known as a one-time-pad, and an appropriate hash function, 
information could be encrypted that was theoretical secure [2:10-12]. Problems that arise 
in experimental systems stem from non-idealities that occur such as equipment 
constraints, environmental context, and protocol or procedural weaknesses. As a result, 
much work has been done to investigate both the theoretical and experimental 
weaknesses in QKD and several well-known attacks have been published and mitigated 
[4]. 
2.3 Quantum Key Distribution Published Papers 
Three distinct types of QKD papers will be reviewed in this thesis. This research 
will review early papers on QKD, various practical implementations, and finally 
vulnerability analyses.  
Two critical early papers proposing quantum key distribution protocols are [8, 9]. 
“Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin Tossing” published by 
Bennett and Brassard was one of the first papers to propose a protocol for using quantum 
particles to transmit information over a quantum channel in such a way that it would be 
impossible to eavesdrop without being detected [8]. This protocol, known as BB84, 
describes the secure distribution of random key information between two parties. The 
paper entitled “Experimental Quantum Cryptography” describes a more detailed design 
of the first experimental implementation of a QKD channel between two users that share 
no initial secret information [9]. The paper provides an illustration of the original QKD 
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protocol, the modifications necessary to implement the protocol experimentally, the 
apparatus used, possible sources of information leakage and the actual experimental data 
transmitted. 
More recent proposals for implementing a QKD system include [10,11,12]. 
“Quantum Key Distribution over 122 km of Standard Telecom Fiber” reports the first 
demonstration of QKD using standard fiber over 100 km [10]. It presents a practical 
implementation and discusses the error rate, key formation rate and other factors limiting 
maximum fiber length and therefore maximum distance between QKD nodes. “How to 
Implement Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution for a Satellite Uplink with 50 dB 
Channel Loss” addresses how to implement QKD via satellite, which act as a trusted 
node to link two or more ground stations [11]. The system presented handles up to 57dB 
photon loss, which is normally considered to be a very high transmission loss, and 
confirms the viability of a satellite uplink QKD system. “Optical Networking for 
Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Communications” discusses leveraging existing 
fiber infrastructures for quantum communications [12]. This paper describes a potential 
architecture to support widespread quantum communications that provides a more 
efficient networking solution than the more common fixed end-to-end connections 
between Alice and Bob. It does so by experimentally demonstrating several fundamental 
capabilities of optical networking that apply to QKD and examining the practical impact 
to quantum signals.  
The third class of papers reviewed is specific attacks and security vulnerabilities 
in practical QKD [13,14,15,16,17]. “Has Quantum Cryptography Been Proven Secure” 
presents an analysis of the current state of quantum cryptography with particular 
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emphasis on engineering issues [13]. The purpose is to demonstrate the need for more 
rigorous examination of presumed weaknesses. The paper disregards hardware and 
software shortcomings in favor of focusing on defining the problem to be solved in terms 
of mathematical and theoretical rigor. “After-gate Attack on a Quantum Cryptosystem” 
presents a specific intercept-resend attack against a specific QKD system [14]. The paper 
examines how the intercept-resend can be accomplished by targeting a specific 
component of QKD, the gated single-photon detectors, using bright pulses as faked states 
and outlines how to mitigate this vulnerability. “Information Leakage via Side Channels 
in Freespace BB84 Quantum Cryptography” analyzes a free space BB84 implementation 
using polarization encoded attenuated pulses [15]. The report focuses on potential side 
channels by measuring all degrees of freedom.  “Time-Shift Attack in Practical Quantum 
Cryptosystems” discusses a vulnerability caused by an efficiency mismatch between two 
single photon detectors [16]. The paper examines what circumstances cause the 
vulnerability and discusses measures to mitigate. “Effects of Detector Efficiency 
Mismatch on Security of Quantum Cryptosystems” is another paper that addresses 
vulnerabilities presented from detector efficiency mismatches in QKD systems [17]. 
Experimental data is presented as well as protection measures to prevent exploitation. 
2.4 Security Standards 
Over the years, many security Information Technology (IT) standards have been 
published from the existing body of knowledge. Some are tailored for military use, while 
others are designed for commercial application. Some standards are meant to be general, 
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while others have detailed specific requirements. The standards reviewed in this research 
are outlined in the proceeding section.  
Published in 1983, the “Orange Book,” also titled “Department of Defense 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria” is part of the well known “Rainbow 
Series” of computer standards used by the US government in the 1980s and 1990s [35]. 
They were developed to provide a way of evaluating commercially available trusted 
automatic data processing systems. The document itself declares three stated purposes. 
They are [18]:  
1) “To provide a standard to manufacturers as to what security features to build 
 into their new and planned, commercial products in order to provide widely 
 available systems that satisfy trust requirements (with particular emphasis on 
 preventing the disclosure of data) for sensitive applications. 
2) To provide DoD components with a metric with which to evaluate the degree 
 of trust that can be placed in computer systems for the secure processing of 
 classified and other sensitive information. 
3) To provide a basis for specifying security requirements in acquisition 
 specifications.”  
 With these purposes in mind, the Orange Book breaks security requirements 
into four main categories: Security Policies, Accountability, Assurance and 
Documentation. Security policies require a set of rules used by the system to determine 
allowed access for users and accurately determine information sensitivity. Accountability 
mandates that access to information be managed based on who is attempting the access 
and requires the use of audit information to hold the system accountable. Assurance 
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specifies that mechanisms be evaluated, protected and that and each requirement is 
enforced. Documentation supports the first three requirements [18]. 
The Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation is a 
set of documents developed by the international community that form an agreement by 
which IT can be evaluated to determine the fulfillment of certain security properties. 
They are designed to protect assets from “unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss 
of use” [19: v1, 10]. The CC provides requirements for security functionality and 
assurance for hardware, firmware and software. In general the CC is intended to be 
flexible and enable a range of security properties to be looked at for a range of products. 
Given this flexibility, any meaning derived from the CC must be evaluated within 
appropriate context. Additionally, there are certain topics that are stated as beyond the 
scope of the criteria.  
The CC is broken into three parts. Part 1 provides an introduction, Part 2 outlines 
security functional components and Part 3 presents the security assurance components. 
Additionally the CEM, an accompanying document to the CC, provides guidance for an 
evaluator to conduct and evaluation based on the CC. This research focuses on CC Part 2 
and providing the basis for security functional requirements expressed in a protection 
profile or security target. A protection profile is defined as an implementation 
independent security needs statement while a security target is an implementation 
dependent statement of security needs. The security requirements expressed in Part 2 are 
intended to counter threats in the operating environment and to be used to create trusted 
products meeting user needs. As user security requirements change, the functional 
requirements in the CC document may also change. [19] 
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The Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, Security 
Standards for Cryptographic Modules is used by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology to specify the security requirements that must be satisfied by cryptographic 
modules used to protect sensitive, but unclassified, information. Requirements for more 
restrictive information are not addressed in this thesis. FIPS 140-2 covers requirements 
that relate to the design and implementation of a secure module. For additional 
requirements related to specific functions within a cryptographic module a list of cross 
referenced documents are provided within the standard. These additional requirements 
will be noted in this thesis, but not addressed in detail. [20] 
 Thus far standards mentioned have applied generically to secure IT systems or to 
classical cryptographic systems. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) has been in the process of developing and releasing a set of five standards 
documents that apply specifically to QKD systems. They are Components and Internal 
Interfaces, Module Security Specification, Security Proofs, Use Cases and Application 
Interface.  
The Security Proofs standard examines the generic requirements for quantum 
security proofs and serves as a reference for developing evaluation criteria. The main 
themes of the Security Proofs document examine two key challenges to quantum security 
proofs. They are: the subtlety in security definitions of a quantum cryptographic protocol 
and the challenges to enforce assumptions in a practical QKD system. Specifically, the 
Security Proofs standard intends to: 
1) “Make precise the nature of the security claim, including its statistical 
 component” 
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2) “List meaningful restrictions of adversarial action” 
3) “Clarify the difference between security claim of a protocol (based on models) 
 and the security claim of its implementation” 
4) “To carefully list all the usual components of a QKD protocol with their critical 
 characterizations.” [5] 
The specific nature of this document makes evaluating QKD security more 
straight forward than previous and more generic standards discussed, but a difference 
between ideal and implementation, between generic requirements and specific limitations 
of an operating environment, are still a major concern. This will be true of the other two 
ETSI standards as well. In face the Security Proofs standards specifically does not “give 
specific parameters for successful QKD as these numbers change with time” or “endorse 
particular proofs [5].” 
 Module Security Specification presents the requirements for QKD utilized as part 
of a telecommunications security system. It establishes a set of minimum specifications 
that QKD must fulfill based on eleven security aspects identified. Compliance with these 
specifications is stated as “necessary but not sufficient” to ensure security. The document 
does not consider varying security levels of degrees of sensitivity of information. The 
purpose of the Module Security Specification document is to establish requirements that 
will detect any system penetration with high probability. [4]  
 The Components and Internal Interfaces standard defines the properties of QKD 
system components and internal interfaces. Specifically it catalogues relevant 
requirements for interfaces between components commonly used in most QKD systems. 
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This standard emphasizes the need for sufficient definitions of parameters, components 
and operating conditions when implementing QKD. [6] 
 Finally, the Application Interface standard describes the interface between 
security applications and key management and the Use Cases standard describes potential 
implementations for QKD. [7] 
2.5 Systems Engineering and Architecture 
Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary, top down approach to realizing a 
successful system. It is the business of integrating all disciplines and specialties into a 
concerted and structured development process that addresses the entire lifecycle of a 
problem [21].  
Systems architecting is a sub skill of systems engineering. The architect is 
responsible for organizing the system components, guiding principles and relationships 
between components and the external environment. The fundamental purpose of systems 
architecture is a successful mission or vision. The architecture itself is a means to an end 
and should be tailored to fit the purpose. Formal systems architecture is designed to 
promote interoperability and support decision-making processes and solutions [22]. 
Systems engineering and systems architecture processes often go hand in hand 
and are particularly useful for emerging technology such as QKD due to their 
interdisciplinary nature and use of best practices over the entire lifecycle of a project. 
Applying architectural rigor to defining a system visualizes the practical implementation 
aspects and allows the user and architect to work together to decide upon the level of 
abstraction most useful in a tailored analysis. 
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The US Federal Government has established several laws and policies 
encouraging the use of architectures in support of decisions [23,24,25,26,27,28]. The 
formalized framework developed to meet federal guidance is the Department of Defense 
Architecture Framework Version 2.0 (DoDAF V2.0). “DoDAF is the structure for 
organizing architecture concepts, principles, assumptions, and terminology about 
operations and solutions into meaningful patterns to satisfy specific DoD purposes [22].” 
The structure visualization is achieved via models, which consist of documents, 
spreadsheets or graphical representations, and serve to provide a template for organizing 
data in a way that is easier to understand. These individual models, when populated, are 
referred to as views. Several views comprise a viewpoint and viewpoints comprise the 
architectural description. DoDAF V2.0 also allows for user-defined views to be created 
as necessary that allow data to be presented via agency specific methods or preferences. 
The specific visualization used is less important than the data that is collected, organized, 
and stored and as such the models are not prescribed, but rather the data contained within. 
This allows for greater tailorability and the freedom to create and scope architectures that 
meet user requirements. DoDAF V2.0 enumerates eight viewpoints shown in Figure 2 to 
select from when organizing data. [22] 
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Figure 2. Architecture Viewpoints in DoDAF V2.0 [22] 
 
 
 
 
The All Viewpoint contains information relevant to the entire architectural 
description. The scope, time frame, and setting provide a context for the description and 
can include conditions such as goals, vision, doctrine, procedures, etc. Within the All 
Viewpoint are the Overview and Summary Information view which describes the vision, 
goals, and conditions, and the Integrated Dictionary view, which provides a repository of 
definitions for all terms. 
The Capability Viewpoint provides a strategic context for capabilities. It presents 
the goals associated with the ability to achieve desired effects through tasks. The models 
in this viewpoint are high level and meant to communicate the strategic vision and 
capabilities to decision makers. Within the Capability Viewpoint are seven individual 
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views or models that an architect may choose to develop. The Vision model provides the 
overall vision and context described at a high level. The Capability Taxonomy model 
gives a hierarchy of capabilities. The Capability Phasing model shows planned capability 
achievement at various periods of time and conditions. The Capabilities Dependencies 
model describes dependencies and logical grouping of capabilities to be used for 
identification purposes as well as impact analysis, disposal and other management 
functions. The Capability to Organizational Development Mapping model provides 
planned capability deployment and solutions. The Capability to Operational Activities 
Mapping model maps required capabilities to operational activities. The Capability to 
Services Mapping model links capabilities to the services they enable.  
The Data and Information Viewpoint organizes business information 
requirements and structural process rules. It consists of three views: Conceptual Data 
Model, Logical Data Model, and Physical Data Model. The Conceptual Data Model view 
gives high level information concepts such as information items, entities, attributes and 
relationships. The Logical Data Model view documents data requirements and activity 
rules. While specific format is not specified, this may be done with a class or object 
diagram. The Physical Data Model view documents how data elements in the Logical 
Data Model may be implemented and is often described utilizing class or object 
diagrams.  
The Operational Viewpoint describes organizations, tasks and activities that must 
be performed to accomplish the mission. There are nine views within the Operational 
Viewpoint. The High Level Operational Concept Graphic is a graphical and textual 
concept description. The Operational Resource Flow Description shows resource flow 
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between activities. The Operational Resource Flow Matrix describes both resources 
exchanged and their attributes. The Organizational Relationships Chart provides role 
relationships and context between organizations involved in the mission. The Operational 
Activity Decomposition Tree organizes operational activities into a hierarchy. The 
Operational Activity Model provides context to operational activities and their inputs and 
outputs. The Operational Rules Model identifies business rules that provide operational 
constraints. The State Transition Description illustrates operational activities and their 
responses to events. The Event-Trace Description traces a sequence of events in a 
scenario. 
The Project Viewpoint contains three views that document the organizational 
relationships between programs. The Project Portfolio Relationships view describes 
dependency between organizations and projects. The Project Timelines view gives a 
timeline with key milestones and interdependencies. The Project to Capability Mapping 
view maps programs to capabilities to show how the elements achieve capability. 
The Services Viewpoint uses 13 views to describe system, service and 
interconnection functionality. The Services Context Description provides the composition 
and interaction of services while incorporating the human element. The Services 
Resource Flow Description lists resource flow between services. The Systems-Services 
Matrix shows the relationship between systems and their services. The Services-Services 
Matrix shows the relationships between services. The Services Functionality Description 
provides functions performed by each service and activities between them. The 
Operational Activity to Services Traceability Matrix maps service activities to 
operational activities. The Services Resource Flow Matrix shows elements being 
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exchanged between services and the attributes. The Services Measures Matrix provides 
metrics of service elements. The Services Evolution Description lists planned steps for 
evolving services. The Services Technology and Skills Forecast describes emerging 
technologies and skills that may be available during the project timeframe. The Services 
Rules Model describes services functionality by enumerating design or implementation 
constraints. The Services State Transition Description illustrates service functionality by 
identifying service responses to events. The Services Event-Trace Description describes 
services functionality by providing service relevant specifics to critical event sequences. 
The Standards Viewpoint contains two views that capture the minimal rules 
governing system parts or elements as individuals or part of the system. This is the 
viewpoint that will enumerate the applicable technical and engineering implementation 
guidelines. The Standards Profile lists current standards and the Standards Forecast 
describes emerging standards that may apply during project timelines.  
The Systems Viewpoint describes the supporting automated systems, 
interconnectivity, and functionality using 13 views. The Systems Interface Description 
shows systems and interconnections. The Systems Resource Flow Description shows 
resource flow between systems. The Systems-Systems Matrix shows relationships of 
interest such as interfaces between systems. The System Functionality Description 
describes activities and data flows among systems. The Operational Activity to Systems 
Function Traceability Matrix maps system activities to operational activities. The 
Operational Activities to System Traceability Matrix maps the systems to operational 
activities. The Systems Resource Flow Matrix provides system to system resource flow 
exchange elements and attributes. The Systems Measures Matrix lists metrics for model 
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elements. The Systems Evolution Description describes planned steps for an evolving 
suite of systems. The Systems Technology and Skills Forecast provides technologies and 
skill emerging within the project timeline. The Systems Rules Model describes systems 
functionality by identifying constraints due to design or implementation. The Systems 
State Transition Description describes system functionality by identifying responses to 
events. This is often illustrated by a state machine diagram. The Systems Event-Trace 
Description describes system functionality by providing a system specific view for 
critical the operational sequences.  [22]  
In addition to the viewpoint guidelines above, architectures may incorporate 
several fit-for-purpose views. For example, a block diagram or various UML techniques 
may be appropriate ways of representing a system within an IT industry context. 
Whichever model chosen to comprise an architectural definition, there are six key steps 
to follow [29]: 
1. Determine Intended Use of Architecture 
2. Determine Scope 
3. Determine Supporting Data Required 
4. Collect, Organize, Correlate, and Store Data 
5. Conduct Analysis in Support of Objectives 
6. Document Results for Decision Maker Needs  
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided a review of key literature applicable to QKD 
research. It gave a general overview of QKD development and discusses ten published 
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papers that will be analyzed in Chapter 4. Additionally it reviewed the four IT security 
standards that will be addressed: Department of Defense Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria [18], Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation[19], Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules[20], and the five 
ETSI documents [2,4,5,6,7]. Finally, this chapter provided an overview of DoDAF v2.0 
architecture guidelines [22].  
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III.  Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a methodology and approach for 
addressing the research questions. It will discuss Content Analysis and describe the 
method used for data collection. It will also describe the development of the standards 
matrix evaluation criteria and discuss the architectural process by which the prototypical 
QKD system will be developed.  
3.2 Research Strategy 
Content analysis is used to determine the presence of words or concepts within 
text. It allows a researcher to quantify the presence of such concepts formally or 
informally or as broadly or specifically as the researcher decides. A content analysis calls 
for a text to be broken down into manageable categories and then examined using one of 
the basic content analysis methods. The content analysis methods chosen for this research 
is conceptual analysis, which quantifies the presence, either implicit or explicit, of a 
specified concept within a text [36]. 
3.3 Data Collection  
Conceptual analysis begins with identifying the research questions to be answer 
and determining what text will be analyzed. Once selected the text must be broken into 
content categories and then analyzed for specified concepts [36]. This analysis seeks to 
determine whether existing QKD research considers security standards. Based on the 
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research question and selected methodology, an approach for determining the use of IT 
security standards in QKD research is developed here.  
The content to be analyzed is drawn from published QKD research papers. There 
have been a great many papers published on this topic. This research attempts to analyze 
a cross sampling of papers published from the 1980s to present time and does so by 
breaking the content into three main categories:  earlier concepts for QKD 
implementation when less work had been done towards making it a commercially viable 
concept, different possible implementations and uses, known security vulnerabilities in 
practical QKD implementations. From these three categories, 10 papers were chosen for 
review. 
The next step in the research is to specify the concepts to be identified in the 
coding scheme. The concepts were drawn from IT security standards documents. There 
are many standards documents present to select from; however, for this research four 
main documents were used to develop the criteria. These four standards are chosen based 
on general applicability to both secure IT and cryptographic systems and to QKD. 
To determine concepts to be analyzed, each standard requirement is examined, 
not as detailed specifications but rather as general criteria against several published QKD 
papers to see if standard security requirements were considered by the authors. Coding is 
done based on a “met,” “partially met,” or “does not meet” basis. For example, the 
security requirement to authenticate will not be considered met or not met based on a 
detailed explanation of how authentication was accomplished in each set up examined. 
Instead, if the author makes mention of the need to have an authentication mechanism, 
the requirement will be considered met and annotated with an “x.” If the requirement was 
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explicitly met in its entirety the matrix be annotated with an “x*.” This research primarily 
evaluates whether standards criteria were considered, not whether the system presented is 
considered a complete security validation. It would be infeasible given the focus and 
brevity of most published QKD literature to expect a complete published security profile; 
however, it is important to consider certain concepts in discussing any secure 
cryptographic system. With a generalist attitude in mind, security criteria and their 
interpreted applicability to this research and for potential QKD systems are discussed 
here and an analysis of criteria conceptualized in literature will be presented in Chapter 4.   
From the department of defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, 
the Common Criteria, the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3, 
and the ETSI QKD Standards a top level list of minimum considerations was 
consolidated into a standards matrix. A brief explanation of each of the criteria chosen for 
review follows.  
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria will be analyzed in four main 
categories: Security Policy, Accountability, Assurance and Documentation. The security 
policy consists of four main sub areas which are discretionary access control, object 
reuse, labeling, and mandatory access control. Discretionary access control requires that 
access be defined and controlled between users and objects. Object reuse requires 
information within a storage object be revoked prior to assignment to a subject. Labeling 
requires that sensitivity labels be assigned to each resource that is accessible outside the 
system. 
Accountability defines ten sub categories for the scope of this research: 
identification and authentication, audit, system architecture, system integrity, covert 
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channel analysis, trusted recovery, security testing, design specification and verification, 
configuration management, and trusted distribution. Identification and authentication 
specifies requirements for users to identify themselves prior to performing any actions. 
Audit requirements demand that an audit trail be created, maintained and protected for all 
relevant events. The system architecture requires that the system domain be maintained 
for its own execution and be protected from tampering. System integrity determines if 
there are hardware/software features that may be used to validate correct operations. 
Covert channel analysis requires a bandwidth determination of each channel identified. 
Trusted recovery allows the system to recover without compromise after a system failure. 
Security testing provides proof that the system security mechanisms have been tested. 
Design specification and verification presents a formal, top level model of the system 
security policy. Configuration management requires a control of changes to descriptive 
top-level specification, design data, documentation and code for all security relevant 
hardware, firmware, and software.  Trusted distribution requires a trusted system control 
and distribution facility to maintain integrity between the master data and the on-site 
copy.  
Assurance criteria require that hardware and software provides assurance that 
security requirements are enforced. This may be accomplished by developing a system 
architecture that defines the system domain and hardware/software integrity.  
Documentation criteria can be sub divided into two categories for this research: 
test documentation and design documentation. Test documentation specifies a test plan 
with procedures showing how security mechanisms are tested and stating their results. 
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Design documentation provides the manufacturer’s philosophy of protection. This may 
include interfaces between modules, security policies and protection mechanisms. [18] 
The Common Criteria Standards, being designed to cover a large variety of 
systems, enumerates many requirements to be met by secure systems. For the purposes of 
this research, these standards have been summarized by addressing the key concepts 
presented within the documents, rather than the many specific requirements. The major 
areas addressed by the Common Criteria that this research will review are: Security 
Audit; Non-Repudiation; Cryptographic Key Management to include generation, 
distribution, access and destruction; User Data Protection; Identification and 
Authentication; Security Management; Privacy; Resource Utilization; User Session 
Access; and Trusted Paths/Channels. A brief discussion of each follows. 
Security audits require the generation of data capable of being audited. As such a 
secure system should be able to record, store and select event data relevant to the security 
of a system. What this data is and how it is generated, stored and selected should be 
specified. Additionally, the methods and policies for analysis and the responses to any 
potential security violation should be specified.  
Non-repudiation requires some mechanism in place to ensure that a sender cannot 
deny sending a transmission and a receiver cannot deny having received it. This includes 
the identification of the user, the information transmitted, the destination, and the 
invocation of a non-repudiation service.  
Cryptographic Key Management refers to how cryptographic keys are managed 
throughout their lifecycle. The lifecycle of a cryptographic key covers its generation, 
distribution, access, and eventual destruction. Each of these tasks is required to be done 
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in accordance with a specified method and applicable standard. For key generation an 
algorithm, key size and standard should be given. For key distribution, access, and 
destruction the method and standard should be stated. The Common Criteria includes 
requirements for cryptographic operations as well; however, the focus of most QKD 
systems to date is managing the key itself, not the functions performed utilizing that key. 
While it will be important to consider cryptographic operations when implementing in the 
larger context, it is not a particular concern in simply developing a QKD module to 
manage cryptographic keys and so the operations portion of this criteria is acknowledged, 
but not emphasized in this research with a place in the standards matrix. 
User data protection includes the requirements related to protected user data 
during import export and storage of information. It also specifies any security attributes 
that relate to user data. This may include access control functions and policies that relate 
to this requirement. 
Identification and authentication establishes requirements to verify user identities. 
Many other security attributes as well as the security of the entire QKD system rely on 
the ability to determine that Alice is in fact Alice and Bob is in fact Bob. To meet this 
critical requirement, mechanisms should be specified that not only authenticate a user’s 
identity but also declare how to handle authentication failures, and quality metrics. 
  Security management encompasses the management of security roles, attributes, 
functions and data. Security management also includes revocation of security attributes 
for entities as well as attribute expiration, or enforcing time limits on security attributes. 
This specifies the attributes to be managed and by whom, the time limits restricting them 
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and the actions to be taken in the event that requirements are not met or time limits 
expire. 
Privacy requirements are designed to provide the user with protection against 
identity discovery and misuse. Privacy ensures that a user may use the system without 
publicly releasing their identity, but can still be accountable for that use. It also ensures 
that a user may use a resource without it being publicly known that the resource is in use.  
Protection of the Target of Evaluation Security Functionality involves protecting 
QKD system security functionality. Many mechanisms appear to duplicate user data 
protection requirements, but the consideration for the criteria emphasizes protecting 
security function data. This requirement considers the implementation and external data 
that governs security functions as well as any external entities that may be required to 
enforce security functional requirements. Examples of specific considerations for this 
requirement are assuring the availability, confidentiality and integrity of exported data, 
trusted recovery, fail safe functions, and time stamps.  
Resource utilization specifies three main concepts: fault tolerance, priority of 
service and resource allocation. Fault tolerance ensures that the system continues to 
function despite failures. It requires that failures can be detected and that system 
capabilities are maintained or, depending on the failure, the system is shut down. Priority 
of service allows users to prioritize tasks. Resource allocation prevents a denial of service 
occurring due to monopolization of resources. In other words, a minimum amount of 
resources are always reserved for priority tasks. 
User session access enumerates the functional requirements for establishing a user 
session. This may include functions relating to limiting selectable attributes for user 
 30 
sessions, limiting the number of user sessions, session locking, session establishment, 
session termination, and access history. This may also include any warning banners 
designed to notify users of appropriate uses of the system. 
 The final conceptual requirement from the Common Criteria addressed in this 
research is trusted paths and channels. This requirement accounts for trusted path 
between the user and the system as well as between the system and other IT products. To 
be a trusted path, the channel generally isolates a subset of data and commands from the 
rest of the data and can provide assurance that the user is communicating with the right 
system and the system is communicating with the right user. [19] 
FIPS Publication 140-2 contains 11 main security requirements governing 
cryptographic modules: cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module ports 
and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security; 
operational environment; cryptographic key management; electromagnetic interference 
and compatibility; self-tests; design assurance; mitigation of other attacks. In Chapter 4, 
each of these will be examined to see if the intent of these criteria are met in part or in 
full by the literature presented. Following is a brief explanation of what is meant by each 
FIPS 140-2 requirement chosen for the purposes of the standards matrix presented in this 
paper.  
A complete cryptographic module specification includes a detailed accounting of 
all hardware, software and firmware. It also includes specification of the cryptographic 
boundary, the security policies, algorithms and approved modes of operation. 
Cryptographic module ports and interfaces require the specification of all 
interfaces for input and output data paths. Depending on the level of security required in 
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the module, it may also require data ports for critical security parameters to be separate 
from other ports.  
Roles, services and authentication refer to the need for identity based operator 
authentication. In this case, the primary operators would be Alice and Bob and this 
requirement is primarily addressing the need for an authentication mechanism as part of 
the operating protocol. Additionally, services to be specified in a cryptographic module 
include showing status, performing self-tests, and performing approved security 
functions. 
A cryptographic module should include finite state model. The finite state model 
should address all operational and error states of the module as well as any transitions 
between states. Input and output events that result in or from transitions should be 
specified. At a minimum the model requires on/off states, crypto officer states such as 
key management and initialization, key entry states, user states, self-test states, and error 
states.  
Physical security encompasses all mechanisms that restrict unauthorized physical 
access. Mechanisms may include automatic zeroization, tamper detection and responses. 
Additionally this includes environmental failure protection which protects against 
environmental conditions and fluctuations whether accidental or induced. As part of this 
requirement, documentation should specify the normal operating ranges of the module.  
The operational environment includes the hardware, firmware and software 
required to operate the cryptographic module. The operating system is a key feature of 
the operational environment. Like many of the criteria addressed here, each security level 
has its own requirements for the operational environment.  
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Cryptographic key management like in the Common Criteria refers to key 
management over the entire lifecycle of the cryptographic key. This includes random 
number and key generation, key establishment, key distribution, key entry/output, key 
storage, and key zeroization.  
Electromagnetic interference and compatibility requires documentation meeting 
standards put forth in 47 Code of Federal Regulations. 
 Self-tests should be documented for secure cryptographic modules. They include 
two main types, power-up tests and conditional tests. Power-up tests occur whenever the 
module is powered up and conditional tests are required whenever a security function is 
invoked. Conditional tests may include pairwise consistency tests for public and private 
keys, software/firmware load tests, manual key entry tests, continuous random number 
generator tests and bypass tests. Test documentation should include successes and 
failures as well as any conditions and actions needed to re-enter normal operations. 
 Design assurance refers to use of best practice for configuration management, 
development, delivery and operation and guidance for the user and crypto officer. 
Configuration management mandates that the functional requirements and specifications 
are met when a system is implemented. It requires that the module, module components 
within the cryptographic boundary and all associated documentation have a configuration 
number. Design assurance during development means assurance that the implementation 
corresponds to the security policy and functional specification. Delivery and operation 
means ensuring that the module is securely delivered to authorized users and is correctly 
installed and implemented. Finally, the guidance provides warnings and instructions for 
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use as well as guidance on how to administer the module such as assumptions, security 
parameters, and administrative functions. 
Mitigation of other attacks covers any attacks for which there were no security 
requirements known when the standards were published. This is of particular importance 
in QKD given the uniqueness of the technology and relatively limited commercial field 
time. When considering mitigation of other attacks the cryptographic module’s security 
policy should specify security mechanisms used. These mechanisms will be validated as 
requirements and appropriate tests are developed. [20] 
The ETSI QKD standards documents released in recent years consist of five parts: 
Application Interface, Components and Internal Interface, Module Security Specification, 
Security Proofs, and Use Cases. For the purpose of this research, we will focus primarily 
on the Module Security Specification which enumerates a number of specific security 
requirements for QKD. The standards matrix pulls all documentation requirements from 
this module and examines each requirement individually to see if it has been met. To a 
less specific extent, but no less important, requirements from the other four standards are 
addressed. The Components and Interface standard acknowledge that while different 
implementations of QKD possess different components, there are some that are most 
commonly used. These components are defined in terms of parameters, operating 
conditions, and component configuration where possible. From this, three general 
requirements for parameters, operating conditions and defining components will be added 
to the standards matrix. The Application Interface describes the key management layer 
that de-multiplexes secure bits into separate groups and passes to their associated 
applications. The Security Proofs standard is not represented in the standards matrix 
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explicitly. While incredibly useful in developing a QKD system and understanding the 
assumption and principles on which its security is based, the philosophy required by this 
standard is covered in requirements elsewhere [2,4,5,6,7]    
3.4 QKD Architecture 
 The architectural framework that will be utilized for this research is the DoDAF 
V2.0 discussed in Chapter 2. DoDAF V2.0 is the framework guidance proposed for DoD 
managers and process owners to specify requirements and control development. The 
development is a six step process: 
1. Determine Intended Use of Architecture 
2. Determine Scope 
3. Determine Supporting Data Required 
4. Collect, Organize, Correlate, and Store Data 
5. Conduct Analysis in Support of Objectives 
6. Document Results for Decision Maker Needs [29] 
This thesis will attempt to demonstrate a basic prototypical framework for a QKD system 
that utilizes industry standards as the primary requirements considerations for a new 
technology, not a complete working implementation. In depth analysis of specific system 
implementations is left for future research. As such, the architecture presented here will 
not present a complete meta-model, but rather utilize DoDAF v2.0 guidelines to produce 
several top level architectural viewpoints that best illustrate IT security standards 
practices. 
 35 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a methodology and approach for addressing the research 
questions. It discussed Content Analysis and described the method used for data 
collection. It also described the development of the standards matrix evaluation criteria 
and discussed the architectural process by which the prototypical QKD system will be 
developed.  
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will present the completed matrix and architecture. 
4.2 Standards Matrix 
The fully populated standards matrix is sparse, which is not an unexpected result 
considering the published research surveyed addressed either general concerns for 
implementing QKD or very specific vulnerabilities. Most of the positive results where 
published papers are determined to have addressed standards criteria in the matrix only 
partially or indirectly acknowledge them as requirements. Most of the literature did not 
attempt to formalize them. There were no specified or derived criteria in the matrix that 
were entirely addressed by the surveyed literature. The specific positive results of the 
standards matrix are explained below. 
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Orange Book 
("Department 
of Defense 
Trusted 
Computer 
System 
Evaluation 
Criteria, 1983)
Security Policy: Discretionary Access Control
Security Policy: Object Reuse
Security Policy: Labels
Security Policy: Mandatory Access Control
Accountability: Identification and Authentication x x x
Accountability: Audit
Assurance: System Architecture x x x x
Accountability: System Integrity x
Accountability: Covert Channel Analysis x x
Accountability: Trusted Recovery
Accountability: Security Testing x x x
Accountability: Design Specification and Verification
Accountability: Configuration Management
Accountability: Trusted Distribution
Documentation: Test Documentation x
Documentation: Design Documentation  
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Table 2. Common Criteria Matrix 
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Common 
Criteria
Security Audit x x
Communication: Non-Repudiation
Cryptographic Key Management: Generation x x x x
Cryptographic Key Management: Distribution x x x x x
Cryptographic Key Management: Access
Cryptographic Key Management: Destruction
User Data Protection
Identification and Authentication x x
Security Management
Privacy
Resource Utilisation x x
TOE Access: User Session Access
Trusted Path/Channels x x x
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Security Standards for Cryptographic Modules Matrix 
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Federal Information 
Processing Standards 
Publication 140-2, 
Security Standards for 
Cryptographic Modules
Cryptographic Module Specification x x x x x
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
Roles, Services, and Authentication x x x
Finite State Model
Physical Security x
Operational Environment
Cryptographic Key Management x x x x
Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility x x
Self-Tests x x
Design Assurance
Mitigation of Other Attacks x x x x x x x  
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Table 4. ETSI Matrix 
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ETSI QKD 
Standards
Parameters Defined x x x x x x x x x
Operating Conditions Defined x x x
Components Defined x x x x x x
Specification of the hardware 
and software configuration 
items x
Specification of any hardware 
or software configuration items 
of a QKD module that are 
excluded from the security 
requirements x
Specification of the physical 
ports and logical interfaces.
Specification of the manual or 
logical controls, status 
indicators, and applicable 
physical, logical, and electrical 
characteristics.
List of all security functions, 
both Approved and non-
Approved, specification of all 
modes of operation
Block diagram depicting all of 
the major hardware 
components
Specification of the design of 
the hardware and software. x x x x x
Specification of all security-
related information whose 
disclosure or modification can 
compromise the security.
Specification of a Security 
Policy
Specification of the physical 
ports and logical interfaces and 
all defined input and output 
data paths.
Specification of all authorized 
roles supported.
Specification of the services, 
operations, or functions 
provided, both Approved and 
non-Approved
Specification of any services 
provided for which the operator 
is not required to assume an 
authorized role
Specification of the 
authentication mechanisms 
supported x x
Documentation shall specify 
which approved software 
integrity techniques are used.
Documentation shall specify 
the MSI commands employed.
Specification of the operational 
environment. x
Specification of the physical 
security mechanisms that are 
employed.
Specification of the 
maintenance access interface 
and how plaintext secret and 
private keys and other CSPs 
are to be zeroized when the 
maintenance access interface 
is accessed.  
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If split knowledge 
procedures are used, 
proof that if knowledge 
of n key components is 
required to reconstruct 
the original key, then 
knowledge that any n-1 
key components 
provides no information 
about the original key 
other than the key's 
length.
Specification of the SSP 
storage methods.
Specification of the SSP 
zeroization methods.
Specification of self-
tests. x
Specification of the error 
states.
Specification of all 
security functions critical 
to the secure 
operationand 
identification of the 
applicable pre-
operational, conditional, 
and critical functions 
tests.
If a QKD module 
implements a bypass 
capability, specification 
of the mechanism or 
logic governing the 
switching procedure.
Specification of 
procedures for secure 
installation, generation, 
and start-up.
Specification of the 
procedures for 
maintaining security 
while distributing and 
delivering.
Specification of the 
correspondence 
between the design of 
the hardware/software of 
a QKD module and the 
Security Policy.
If a QKD module 
contains software, 
specification of the 
source code for the 
software.
If a cryptographic 
module contains 
hardware, specification 
of the schematics and/or 
the HDL listings for the 
hardware. x x x x x x
Functional specification 
that informally describes 
a QKD module.
x
Specification of a formal 
model that describes the 
rules and characteristics 
of the Security Policy.
Specification of a 
rationale that 
demonstrates the 
consistency and 
completeness of the 
formal model with 
respect to the Security 
Policy.
Specification of an 
informal proof of the 
correspondence 
between the formal 
model and the functional 
specification.
For each 
hardware/software 
component, source code 
annotation with 
comments.
Specification of an 
informal proof of the 
correspondence 
between the design of 
the QKD module and the 
functional specification.
Cryptographic Officer 
guidance
User guidance
If a QKD module is 
designed to mitigate one 
or more specific attacks, 
specification of security 
mechanisms employed 
to mitigate the attack(s).
x x x x x x x
Definition of QKD 
Module Security Policy
Specification of a 
Cryptographic Module 
Security Policy x x x x
ETSI QKD 
Standards
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Specification of the 
normal operating 
ranges. Specification 
of the environmental 
failure protection 
features. x x x
Specification of the 
mitigation techniques 
against applicable 
Timing Analysis 
attacks.
Specification of the 
mitigation techniques 
against applicable 
SPA attacks.
Specification of the 
mitigation techniques 
against applicable 
DPA attacks.
Specification of the 
mitigation techniques 
against applicable 
EME attacks.
Specification of all 
cryptographic keys, 
cryptographic key 
components.
Specification of each 
RBG (Approved 
RBGs and non-
Approved RBG 
entropy sources). x x
Specification of each 
of the key generation 
methods (Approved 
and non-Approved). x x x x x x
Specification of the 
key establishment 
methods. x x x x x x
Specification of the 
key entry and output 
methods.
ETSI QKD 
Standards
 
 
 
 
The first paper analyzed using the standards matrix is [8]. As one of the earlier 
papers presenting the possibility of a practical QKD system, the authors effectively 
present several key concepts to consider. The primary concern is the protocol used to 
generate and distribute the cryptographic key. To present this then novel idea, the authors 
presented a scheme, known today as the BB84 protocol, to generate and transmit enough 
random bits through a quantum channel to serve as a one-time pad. Bennett and Brassard 
also provided a basic test for eavesdropping via bit agreement and suggested that an 
eavesdropper would cause a 25% bit error rate. Additionally, the authors recommended 
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utilizing a Wegman-Carter [31] authentication tag for messages over the public channel 
to prevent active eavesdropping. The authentication tag would create a trusted channel, 
which the Common Criteria defines as “a communication channel that may be initiated 
by either side of the channel, and provides non-repudiation characteristics with respect to 
the identity of the sides of the channel.” Given this definition, Trusted Path/Channels 
were also partially addressed by mention of authentication requirements. In total 12 out 
of 95, or 12.6% of the criteria included in the standards matrix were partially addressed 
by this proposed system. 
The 1991 paper “Experimental Quantum Cryptography” presented results for the 
first experimental QKD channel. Like the 1984 paper above it stated the need for a public 
channel authentication scheme and presented a basic key generation and distribution 
protocol. The 1991 also paper proposed a specific method for randomness and presented 
a physical description of the apparatus while defining some of the required parameters 
and operating conditions. The experimental set up addressed two specific QKD attacks: 
intercept/resend and beam splitting as well has how to determine the information leaked 
if exploited. Finally, it presented test results to see if results are as expected [9]. In total, 
22 of 95, or 23.2% of the examined criteria were partially addressed in some form. 
In “Quantum Key Distribution over 122 km of Standard Telecom Fiber” the 
authors presented a basic set up of the quantum module. There was no description of the 
classical channel included. The paper addressed causes of error including physical 
imperfections in the system. As a result, error rates are parameterized. Furthermore, this 
paper discussed a pulse splitting attack and method to mitigate [10]. These key points 
partially considered 8 of 95, or 8.4% of the standards requirements. 
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“Has Quantum Cryptography Been Proven Secure” asserted that additional 
engineering rigor is required before QKD can be declared secure. It presented a 
discussion of various QKD assertions and the impact of specific attacks. It does not 
however, propose a specific system or address any security criteria other than specifying 
attacks [13]. As a result, on 1 of 95 or 1.1% of the criteria were addressed in this paper. 
“Optical Networking for Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum 
Communications” provided a look at how we would utilize existing fiber infrastructures 
to implement QKD. Key properties and parameters addressed in this paper were traffic 
distribution, bit rate, wavelength and power levels. Environmental effects were 
considered. Software was mentioned, but not elaborated upon and standard QKD 
protocols such as error correction, privacy amplification and authentication were 
addressed. Auto-synchronization was also presented. Finally, a basic network diagram 
was explained [12]. These key discussion points addressed 16 of 95, or 16.8% of the 
criteria analyzed.  
A paper covering implementing a satellite outlined the basic cryptographic key 
process in a section under system configuration which provided a basic implementation 
diagram wherein Alice was the transmitter, Bob the receiver and satellites act as trusted 
nodes. Several parameters were identified, most notably wavelength, timing/precision, 
phase, intensity, key rate and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER). Randomness was handled 
through passive basis selection. Environmental concerns and the effects of background 
noise and attenuation were addressed. Further, the need to synchronize systems and 
implement mechanisms for systems leaving their stated parameters was noted. Processing 
overhead on the classical channel was a concern and channel performance was analyzed. 
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Finally, a decoy state protocol was proposed to mitigate specific vulnerabilities [11]. In 
total, these stated concerns, while not completely developed in a formal specification, 
lead to this paper addressing 22 out of 95 or 23.2% of the criteria. 
“After-gate Attack on a Quantum Cryptosystem” addressed criteria by discussing 
various known attacks, how to mitigate them and identified the parameters and timing 
issues required. In particular, this paper addressed the component parameters of an 
Avalanche Photo Diode which is the most common type of Single Photon Detector used 
in QKD [14]. This considers 5 of 95 or 5.3% of the criteria. 
“Information Leakage via Side Channels” was the second of the specific 
vulnerability papers and as such provided a discussion of the vulnerability associated 
with side channels. Additionally, it presented an informal sketch of the physical set up 
and an explanation of the cryptographic key protocol with accounting for a digital 
calibration of light pulses. Parameters specified included wavelength, APD efficiency, 
jitter, and some test parameters for lasers [15]. These specifics imply consideration for 9 
of 95, or 9.5% of the criteria. 
“Time-Shift in Practical Quantum Cryptosystems” discussed how to exploit an 
imperfection in the efficiency of single photon detectors, which are components typically 
used in QKD.  In doing so, the paper discussed synchronization, provided a partial sketch 
of the physical system and declared use of BB84 protocol for key generation and 
distribution [16]. These key points addressed 10 of 95 or 10.5% of the criteria. 
The final paper, “Effects of Detector Efficiency Mismatch on Security of 
Quantum Cryptosystems” focused on the photon number splitting attack while specifying 
BB84 protocol for key generation and distribution. Due to the attack focus most 
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parameters discussed are for single photon detectors: experimental detector sensitivity 
results, wavelength requirements, and quantum bit error rate. Additionally this paper 
discussed the set of all possible input signals and how to respond, including responses to 
failure/input outside expected parameters [17]. It partially discussed 15 of 95, or 15.7% 
of standards criteria.  
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Figure 3, Security Standards Matrix Summary 
 
Figure 3 above, summarizes the results of the content analysis. This answers the 
question: To what extent do published QKD systems meet security standards? It is seen 
that while evidence of some security standards concepts investigated can be found in the 
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published literature analyzed, no papers revealed a definitive discussion or emphasis on 
the criteria. The best results addressed approximately 23% of the standards body of 
knowledge.  
4.3 QKD Architecture 
 This section will address the results of the architecture process outlined in Chapter 
3. Step 1, Determine Intended Use of Architecture is addressed by the second research 
question of this thesis. The purpose of the architecture is to determine how to develop a 
prototypical systems architecture definition for future QKD development. Particularly, it 
will be tailored reflect the security standards requirements examined in this thesis, as well 
as identify critical components, primary functions, and non-idealities to the system.  
 With this overarching purpose in mind, we move on to Step 2, Determine Scope. 
The architecture contained within this section is scoped to also primarily address the 
research questions discussed in Chapter 1. Rather than developing a complete meta 
model, only views deemed most important are presented in this chapter. The information 
is kept sufficiently high level to avoid issues associated with the multiple methods for 
implementing QKD, but detailed enough to provide researchers a guideline for 
implementation considerations. First and foremost, this architecture is meant to highlight 
concepts and process that should be applied to future development. Both the Use and the 
Scope of the architecture are addressed in a DoDAF AV-1 model below in Table 5.  
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Table 5. AV-1 
This AV-1 is an executive-level summary of the (QKD) architecture.  This initial version of the AV-1 
focuses the architecture development effort by documenting the scope and intended usage.   
Architecture Project Identification 
Name Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Architecture 
Assumptions 
and 
Constraints 
The QKD architecture: 
• Will make maximum use of DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF v.0) and 
SysML/UML products with changes made as necessary 
• Will be tailored for maximum design flexibility and usefulness 
• Will use only optical and electrical hardware components that are currently 
available 
• Will use software (e.g. operating systems, classical communications protocol, 
etc.) that is currently available. 
• Will emphasize industry security standards. 
Approval Authority • AFIT, Department of Systems Engineering Management 
• AFIT, Department of Computer and Electrical Engineering 
Date Completed Feb 2012 
LOE and Costs Level of effort will be consistent with Master’s Thesis requirements.  
Scope: Architecture View(s) and Products Identification 
Products Developed 
This QKD architecture consists of the set of integrated architecture products -- 
AV-1, AV-2, SV-1, SV-10, StdV-2, Block Diagram, Use Cases, Fit-for-purpose 
policy 
Scope The scope of the QKD architecture is to demonstrate how architectural definition 
identifies functions, and technology that are required in order to successfully 
develop a secure quantum key distribution system. 
Time Frames 
Addressed 
The QKD architecture would serve as the basis for further research and 
development of QKD implementations. 
Organizations 
Involved 
Development of initial QKD architecture would realistically involve organizations 
from the DoD as follows:  
• Air Force Institute of Technology 
• Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences  
• Sandia National Laboratory  
Purpose and Viewpoint 
Purpose This architecture will provide a prototype for future research and recommendations for a QKD system.  
Questions to be 
Answered 
The following questions are considered critical to successful completion of the 
architecting effort. The QKD architecture should be capable of sufficiently 
answering how systems architecture definition provides a blueprint for future 
QKD development. In particular: 
              a) What standards apply to QKD? 
b) What are the main system functions? 
c) What are the critical system components?  
d) How do actual hardware components differ from the ideal system 
assumed in the security proofs?  
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Architecture 
Viewpoint 
The QKD architecture is developed primarily from DoDAF V2.0. 
Context 
Mission 
QKD is a response by the scientific community to the threat posed by a 
quantum computer to some traditional cryptographic algorithms. While the QKD 
“algorithm” can be proven mathematically secure, this proof is based upon certain 
assumptions about the hardware/software used to implement QKD. The actual 
security provided by QKD will depend upon the physical implementation of the 
QKD “algorithm” and how well real hardware/software matches the ideal 
assumed in security proofs. 
QKD is envisioned as a next generation cryptographic key distribution 
system capitalizing on quantum mechanics principles to generate shared keys. 
These shared key will be used as a One Time Pad or as shared symmetric secret 
keys. 
Goals The goal of a QKD system is to allow two or more parties to share a secret. 
Rules, Criteria, and 
Conventions 
Followed 
• IT Standards for Secure Systems and Cryptographic Modules 
• European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
• National Institute of Standards and Technology 
• Department of Defense 
• Common Criteria 
• Quantum Mechanics Principles 
• Cryptographic Principles 
• DoDAF v2.0 and AP233 (SysML) will be utilized in developing the system 
architecture. 
Tools and File Formats Used 
Enterprise Architect v8.0, Microsoft; Word and Excel, Adobe Acrobat 
 
 
 
In addition to the AV-1, Step 2 also begins the development of the AV-2 or 
integrated dictionary. Throughout the architecture process it is important to keep a 
common vocabulary. Terms should be collected and defined to clarify any ambiguity that 
may arise from inconsistencies. A model dictionary is prepared from common terms 
found in QKD below in Table 6. This is far from a complete listing of every component 
and parameter possible, but is tailored to provide a reference point for terms presented 
within the scope of this thesis. Additional parameters and components that should be 
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included in an in depth dictionary and architecture are many and depend on the type of 
implementation being defined.  
By analyzing the data collected in the AV-1, a developer begins to understand 
Step 3, Determine Supporting Data. The supporting data required is decided upon based 
on the mission and project requirements outlined in the AV-1 during Step 2. This context 
allows the architect to consider what additional views should be developed to organize 
and catalogue this information. The information contained in the project overview 
requires at a minimum this QKD architecture should include the AV-1 or project 
overview itself, the AV-2 or integrated project dictionary, the OV-1 or concept graphic, 
the SV-10 state transition diagram, StdV-1 or current applicable standards listing, a block 
diagram, use cases, and a fit-for-purpose view. By developing these views or models, the 
architecture will address the major requirements put forth in the standards studied both by 
enumerating them in the StdV-1 standards listing and by reflecting them throughout the 
architecture development as well as meet the additional objectives defined by the project. 
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Table 6. AV-2 
Object Type Description
Avalanche Photodiode Component A device that transforms a weak optical signal into a (more) detectable signal with finite probability.  The most 
common type of Single Photon Detector.
Beam Splitter Component Splits an optical pulse into two weaker (typically equal intensity) pulses.  The reflected pulse undergoes a 90 
degree phase shift.
Buffers Component The hardware and connections related to QKD buffers. This includes input/output buffers, plaintext/ciphertext 
buffers and control buffers
Classical Photo Detector Component A device that transforms an optical signal into an electrical signal.
Classical/Public Channel Component A non-quantum transmission medium that is used to perform sifting, error correction, privacy amplification and 
transmit initial authentication. It may consist of phone lines, radio, ethernet, or other classical media. In this 
architecture, "classical channel" is assumed to be ethernet or fiber connected to a generic computer 
communications network.
Clock Component A device that provides timing pulses to the rest of the machine.
Control Electronics Component The physical components of the system controller.
Fiber Component Fiber Optic Cable made of optical fibers, usually glass filaments, that can transmit data in the form of light 
pulses.
Intensity Modulator Component A device that can actively set the intensity of a photon pulse that is passing through it.
Interference Filter Component Reduces the intensity and spectral width of the laser pulse, typically to select a portion of the spectrum at which 
the photodetectors have a high quantum efficiency
Key Storage Component The hardware and connections used for key storage.
Laser Pulse Generator Component A quantum signal generator using laser pulses. Either a continuous wave laser that is pulsed by a switch, or a 
pulsed laser (e.g. q-switched).
Memory Component The hardware and connections used to provide working and program memory.
Phase/Signal Modulator Component A device that alters the phase of a given pulse of light.  This can be as simple as a small delay line.
Power Supply Component The hardware and connections used to provide power to the system.
Quantum Channel Component A communications channel for transmitting quantum signals. The physical medium varies based on system 
implementation. For the purposes of this architecture, the quantum channel is assumed to be optical fiber. 
Random Number 
Generator/Random Bit 
Generator
Component A device that outputs unpredictable binary bit sequences.  This can be accomplished using physical features 
such as quantum noise. 
Single Photon 
Generator/Quantum Signal 
Generator
Component An optical source that emits, at most, one photon at a time. In practical implementations, a weak attenuated 
pulse is substituted for a single photon generator. 
Alice Entity Alice is the quantum information sender
Bob Entity Bob is the quantum information receiver
Classical Module Entity The portion of the QKD system that functions on a classical communication channel and whose function and 
security are based on classical proofs.
Control Module Entity Controls all cryptographic entities
Quantum Module Entity The portion of the QKD system that functions on a quantum communication channel and whose security and 
functions are based on quantum mechanics principles and proofs.
Afterpulse Parameter The probability that a single photon detector will register a photon detection event tiggered by a previous photon 
detection
Dark Count Parameter The probability that a single photon detector will register a photon when none is present. 
Error Rate Parameter The expected percentage of bit errors in a raw quantum key based on probabilistic quantum properties and 
physical system limitations.  An error rate over a specified threshold indicates a potential problem within the 
QKD system.
Jitter Parameter Uncertainty in detection time for a single photon detector. 
Authentication Term Definition The process by which a user such as Alice or Bob confirms their identity.
Error Correction Term Definition The process by which Alice and Bob ensure their sifted keys are identical.
Heralded Photons Term Definition Low photon-count weak coherent pulses that are preceded in time by a brighter pulse of light.
Key Sifting/Distillation Term Definition The process by which Alice and Bob agree on a cryptographic key.
Perfect Security Term Definition Information theoretic perfect security.  By definition, secure even against an adversary with unlimited computing 
power.  QKD proofs use quantum physics to achieve this level of security, at least on a mathematical level.
Polarization Basis Term Definition A pair of orthogonal polarizations.  The three polarization bases are rectilinear (horizontal and vertical), diagonal 
(+45 and -45 degrees), and rotational (left- and right-circular).  In QKD, each polarization in each basis is 
arbitrarily defined as either a 0 or a 1.  Of note is that any polarization measured in an incorrect basis has an 
equal probability of being measured as either a 0 or a 1.
Privacy Amplification Term Definition A method for reducing the amound of information gained by an unauthorized third party during key 
Synchronization Term Definition The process by which Alice and Bob determine their clock timing.
 
 
 
Step 4, Collect, Organize, Correlate and Store Data is carried out by collecting 
and storing data. In the case of this research, data was collected from a background 
review of information pertaining to QKD and standards. The data was reviewed for 
security requirements, system functions and component configuration. This data was then 
organized into the views presented here.  
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Step 5 of the architecting process, Conduct Analysis in Support of Objectives, 
involves determining the adherence to requirements. It also identifies additional steps 
needed to complete the description. By applying the standards criteria synthesized in the 
matrix to the architecture developed in this Chapter, the results show that it addresses the 
majority of the requirements from a high level perspective. A summary comparison of all 
the papers and the architecture discussed here is presented in Figure 3. When this 
architecture is developed in lower levels of abstraction, these considerations will be 
specified in detail.  
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Figure 4. Standards Consideration Comparison Summary 
 
 
In addition to the products already developed, results of the comparison indicate 
where the top level architecture is not sufficient to meet standards. This allows 
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recommendations to be made for additional development. Areas where this proposed 
architecture fails to consider standards are primarily in software documentation. For now, 
the architecture products discussed in Steps 3 provide a prototype of the hardware 
configuration, functions and processes that must be addressed. Step 6 will illustrate the 
remaining views in this research. 
Step 6, Document Results in Accordance with Decision-Maker Needs presents the 
actual architecture for review. The StdV-1 in Table 7 provides the information for 
relevant standards documents. The standards enumerated in Table 7 are limited to those 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
 
 
Table 7. StdV-1 
Name Author Date Version
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) QKD Module Security 
Specification European Telecommuncations Standards Institute 2010 V1.1.1
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Security Proofs European Telecommuncations Standards Institute 2010 V1.1.1
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Components and Internal 
Interfaces European Telecommuncations Standards Institute 2010 V1.1.1
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Application Interface European Telecommuncations Standards Institute 2010 V1.1.1
Quantum Key Distribution; Use Cases European Telecommuncations Standards Institute 2010 V1.1.1
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Security 
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules National Institute of Standards and Technology 2001 140-2
Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria United States Department of Defense 1985
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation 
Part Australia The Defence Signals Directorate 2009 3.1
New Zealand Government Communications Security 
Bureau
Canada Communications Security Establishment
France Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des 
Systèmes d'Information
Germany Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik
Japan Information Technology Promotion Agency
Netherlands National Communications Security 
Agency
Spain Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas and
Centro Criptológico Nacional
United Kingdom Communications-Electronics 
Security Group
United States National Security Agency
United States National Institute of Standards and 
Technology
 
 
 
 52 
The OV-1 concept graphic is shown below in Figure 4. It demonstrates the 
simplest top level concept view of a QKD system. A QKD system is designed to share a 
secret between at least two people. It consists of two or more nodes. Each node contains a 
quantum module and a classical module that communicate with the necessary 
components.  
 
Quantum Module
Classical ModuleClassical Module
Quantum Module
Alice Bob
Hey Bob, I have a secret…
Classical 
Channel
Quantum 
Channel
 
Figure 5. OV-1 
 
 
 
The concept graphic must be developed further into other views. The next view 
developed here is a block definition diagram. The block definition diagram is explicitly 
required by the ETSI standards and provides an opportunity to examine the critical 
components and interfaces in a QKD system by delving another level into the quantum 
and classical modules. The block diagram allows an architect to begin to provide a 
module specification.  
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The classical module contains the components that perform classical 
communications functions as well as interface with the classical or public channel. The 
quantum module contains the apparatus unique to quantum key distribution and the 
quantum modules send data across a quantum channel. Additionally, the classical and 
quantum modules must interface with each other.  Within a quantum module the photon 
pulses are generated, attenuated, encoded and detected. In this illustration, we assume 
that Alice is the secret sender and will generate and encode the photons and Bob is the 
secret receiver and will receive and decode the photons. It is important to note that Alice 
as the secret sender does not always generate the signal for all possible implementations, 
but for simplicity and the need to discuss component architecture, we assume it to be the 
case here. Additionally, the quantum channel can be considered a trusted channel. The 
full implications of this should be explored in a more detailed architecture. 
The block diagram in Figure 5 depicts Alice and Bob containing a quantum and 
classical module. The critical classical components depicted are a clock, power supply, 
key storage, buffers and memory. The quantum apparatus or quantum module contains an 
element of randomness, a way of altering the quantum signal, and a component(s) that 
either generate a quantum signal, such as a laser, or detect a quantum signal, such as an 
Avalanche Photo-Diode (APD). At this level of abstraction the architecture begins to 
utilize non ideal components. The laser that generates a quantum signal does not generate 
single photons required by security protocols and the APD is not a perfect single photon 
detector. If an architect were to define another layer in each component, these non-ideal 
components could begin to be analyzed from an architectural perspective.  
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Figure 6. Block Diagram 
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The classical and quantum modules will need to interface. The interface will 
eventually need to define the physical and logical interconnections, but that detail is left 
for developers. Additionally, the interface will need to consider the possibility of 
different levels of security requirements as the quantum channel is generally considered 
secure and the classical channel is public. Finally, at this level, Alice and Bob will need a 
way for information to flow on a classical and quantum channel. As physical and logical 
definition gets more detailed, configuration management will also become important.  
Also specified in the ETSI standards is a Finite State Model. In this research, the 
Finite State Model is represented using an SV-10 State Transition Diagram. The main 
states of a QKD system as well as their event triggers are shown in Figure 6. In a lower 
level architecture this would be developed sufficiently to prove that the module complies 
with all standards requirements. Details on the security implications of each state and 
transition will be provided. Security standards require the following states to be included: 
Power on/off, Initialization, Crypto Officer, CSP Entry, Approved, Self-test and Error. 
The model below also includes a Calibration, Synchronization and Authentication. 
Theses states were displayed separately due to their security function criticality. Only a 
single error state is shown, however as event triggers and other events are provided in 
greater detail, the error state will need to be better specified. Additionally, it should be 
noted that “Approved Operations” encompasses the actual QKD key-exchange process. 
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Figure 7. State Transition Diagram 
 
 
 
UML Use Cases must also be developed to describe the critical functions a QKD 
system must perform. The use cases below describe these main functions. Use cases are 
developed in a casual format.  
Use-Case: Start System 
Brief Description 
To successfully start a QKD system, the components must be powered on and 
pass a series of start-up self tests. The start-up tests should be designed to determine if all 
components are present and operating within acceptable parameters, are functioning 
without compromise and they must not radiate information beyond the cryptographic 
boundary (i.e. the data output must be disabled). The system should operate in initial start 
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up mode at minimum long enough to eliminate correlation between initial state and 
operational state.  
Preconditions 
The QKD system is securely delivered and installed. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Use-Case: Perform Self Test 
Brief Description 
Self-tests ensure all components of the module are present and functioning 
correctly and in a secure state. A QKD module performs self-test for three specific 
purposes: pre-operational checks for software integrity, cryptographic algorithm 
implementation, and bypass capability logic; conditional checks for conditions specifying 
pair-wise consistency tests, software load tests, manual key entry tests, continuous RBG 
tests, RBG entropy source tests and conditional bypass tests; and other critical functions 
specified for secure operation. Pre-operational tests must be performed after the system is 
powered up, woken from hibernation state, or switched from one mode of operation to 
another, but prior to authentication or any other security function. Conditional and critical 
function self-tests are performed when conditions are met for specified tests or critical 
security functions, periodically, or when specified by a user. Tests to verify the mitigation 
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of one or more specific known QKD attacks will also be conducted to validate security 
mechanisms. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
In the event a self-test fails, system will enter an error state. Error states must be 
specified along with any response or operating capability restrictions. Response to error 
state should include a need for trusted recovery when results show module to be insecure. 
Degraded Capability 
In the event of self-test failure, system may be operated within a specified 
approved mode of operation supporting degraded capability. 
Maintenance Mode 
If self-test results indicate a problem, system may enter maintenance mode until 
resolved. 
Special Requirements 
Data Output Interface 
All data (except status data output via the status output interface) that is output 
from a cryptographic module (including plaintext data, ciphertext data, cryptographic 
keys, authentication data, and control information for another module) shall exit via the 
"data output" interface. All data output via the data output interface shall be inhibited 
when an error state exists and during self-tests 
Specification Requirements 
Conditions, critical security functions and testing method should be specified.  
Pre-operational Tests  
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Pre-operational Tests should be automatic. 
Use-Case: Calibrate  
Brief Description 
Before beginning operations, a QKD system must be calibrated within 
specification. Additionally, periodic re-calibration will be needed for continuous 
operations. To account for the photon number splitting attack when utilizing an 
attenuated optical pulse, the intensity, photon number statistics and source stability will 
be calibrated. The optical source will be calibrated at high power and then attenuated 
down to single-photon level. The detector will be calibrated utilizing source intensity 
determined by measuring the un-attenuated laser. 
Preconditions 
List all assumptions. Consider that a QKD system includes an optical, electronics, 
and classical layer.  Any assumption made may impact the overall security of the system. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Use-Case: Authenticate  
Brief Description 
QKD requires a secure authentication function and protocol that will be used to 
authenticate the sender, receiver, message text and time-stamp to ensure that the message 
originated and was sent where intended and was not modified during transmission. QKD 
 60 
requires two-factor identity based authentication. The recommended secure function is a 
two-universal hash function. The protocol for the authentication function should ideally 
be submitted as a security proof. Authentication is done on the public channel and initial 
authentication may be handled using a pre-distributed secret. Subsequent authentication 
will use a fraction of the generated key to perform authentication.  
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Special Requirements 
Authentication Strength 
The strength of the authentication mechanism will meet the following: 
• For each attempt to use the authentication mechanism, the probability 
shall be equal to or less than one in 134 217 728 that a false acceptance 
will occur  
• For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-
minute period, the probability shall be equal to or less than one in 4 294 
967 296 that a false acceptance will occur.  
• Time between consecutive attempts will be no less than 2 seconds. 
• Authentication shall be met by implementation and not rely on 
documented procedural controls or security rules (e.g. password size 
restrictions). 
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• If passwords are utilized, then restrictions shall be enforced by the module 
on password selection. 
• Feedback of authentication data to an operator shall be obscured during 
authentication (e.g. no visible display of characters when entering a 
password).  
• Feedback provided during authentication shall not weaken the strength of 
the authentication beyond that required. 
• For first-time authentication, the default authentication data shall be 
unique to each module. 
Object Reuse 
 Each session must be authenticated and no information not pertaining to that 
session may be available to users. 
User Data Protection 
 Authentication mechanisms must be in place that protects user data during the 
authentication process, information flow and export.  
Use-Case: Synchronize  
Brief Description 
Alice and Bob must synchronize their respective clocks prior to beginning 
operations to provide correct, secure operation of the QKD system. Re-synchronization 
must occur at pre-defined conditions to account for frequency drift and jitter. One method 
of synchronization is to use signal and decoy pulses that are attenuated to a single photon. 
After attenuated pulses are created they are wavelength division multiplexed with a much 
stronger clock pulse to synchronize Alice and Bob’s electronics. 
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Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Special Requirements 
Frequency Drift 
Frequency drift will be less than 10-8 parts per clock cycle. 
Jitter 
Jitter will be 10-2 % of a detector gate length. 
Use-Case: Generate Quantum Signal  
Brief Description 
Generate quantum signal describes the process for generating and encoding a 
photon with a bit of information. In practical QKD system, this is done using an 
attenuated optical pulse. For example, Alice generates a weak coherent pulse and 
attenuates to a single photon level. Alice randomly chooses a base value for coding and 
uses a phase modulator to set the base. Alice then stores the base and value for later use. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions. 
Use-Case: Transmit Quantum Signal  
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Brief Description 
The attenuated laser pulse is transmitted over a quantum channel (i.e. fiber or free 
space) to Bob.  
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Use-Case: Detect Quantum Signal 
Brief Description 
Bob’s single photon detectors enter ready state. Bob will randomly select a base 
value and use a phase modulator to set the base. Bob will then set open the set detection 
gate to receive a photon. Once Bob has recorded detection, he will store the base and 
value and the detectors will ender a dead period where they detect no photons.  
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
No Detection 
Because single photon detectors are probabilistic, there may be no detection event 
even if a photon is present. In this case the detectors will remain in ready state. 
False Positive 
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Single photon detectors may yield false positives (ex: dark counts). In this case, 
detectors will ender a dead time and then move back to a ready state. 
Use-Case: Final Key Distillation  
Brief Description 
Once an agreed upon number of photons have been sent and received, Alice and 
Bob communicate over the public channel the base used to send and measure each 
photon. If the bases match, the bits are kept, if they differ, the bits are discarded. If the 
error rate is below a specified threshold, the key is considered secure. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Error Threshold 
If the bit error rate is above a certain threshold, the key is discarded as unsecure 
and cause must be determined.  
Use-Case: Error Correction 
Brief Description 
After an agreed number of photons sent that guarantee a minimum predefined 
length, Alice and Bob have blocks of bits specifying index, base and bit value are stored. 
An error reconciliation protocol such as CASCADE or LDPC is implemented over the 
public channel to ensure both keys are identical.  
Preconditions 
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After key distillation, the error rate must be below the specified threshold to begin 
error correction. 
Use-Case: Privacy Amplification 
Brief Description 
An approved privacy amplification procedure may be used on the results of the 
reconciled blocks. Privacy amplification reduces public knowledge about the final key by 
producing a new, shorter key via a specified function. 
Preconditions 
After key distillation, the error rate must be below the specified threshold to begin 
error correction. 
Use-Case: Monitor Performance 
Brief Description 
Performance statistics will be collected and periodically review to ensure system 
is operating in an approved and expected state. Additionally, performance monitoring 
should indicate if resources are being appropriately utilized and to perform covert 
channel analysis. Parameters monitored should be specified. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the statistics collected indicate unapproved operation, system 
failure or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Use-Case: React to Failure 
Brief Description 
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If at any time the system fails or begins to operate outside of approved modes or 
parameters, steps must be taken to ensure no loss of secret information. As such, a 
method and conditions for stopping and re-starting operations at any point must be 
specified that meet requirements for trusted recovery.  
Use-Case: Audit 
Brief Description 
The system must have a mechanism to record modification, access, deletion, and addition 
of data. This information must be recorded and stored via approved mechanisms to 
prevent unauthorized disclosure, modification or deletion of audit information. Audit 
information must be available upon request by authorized persons. In the event an audit 
detects a potential security event, steps to be taken should be specified. 
Use-Case: Cryptographic Key Management 
Brief Description 
 The QKD protocol accounts for random number generation, key generation and 
key establishment. The Cryptographic Key Management use case must describe the Key 
Entry and Output, Key Storage, and Key Zeroization methods. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
Use-Case: Manage Security 
Brief Description 
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 A process must be established for managing security attributes, data and 
functions. It should specify access control and capability. Additionally, management 
roles and interaction must be defined. 
Alternative Flows 
Error State 
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure 
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability 
restrictions.  
 Finally, within the documentation for a QKD system, there must be some fit for 
purpose view that details the policies the developer plans to ensure trusted distribution 
and physical security. This can be as simple as a policy document describing the methods 
or more complex if the user or developer requires. This view is acknowledged here, but 
the specific format is left up to the developer and user. 
Use-Case: Entropy Loss Estimation 
Brief Description 
 This is the process where all information regarding the QKD system (QBER, 
calibration data, information leaked during error correction, etc.) is utilized to determine 
how much privacy amplification must be done in order to ensure a secure key is 
generated. 
 The above architectural products provide key views and critical information to 
consider when developing a QKD system. They are formatted to provide easily analyze 
how well the prototypical system meets standards, but not to provide any meaningful 
analysis on system performance or quantify security. 
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter demonstrates the extent to which industry technical standards, 
specifically the Common Criteria, FIPS 140-2, DoD Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria and the ETSI QKD standards are utilized in published QKD research. 
Additionally, it presents a prototypical architecture for consideration in future 
development and discusses the extent to which it meets the standards presented. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will answer the investigative questions and discuss shortfalls and 
areas for future research. 
5.2 Investigative Questions Answered 
Published QKD systems address partial security standards requirements 
peripherally, and do not directly consider them when discussing system implementation 
and security concerns. No papers surveyed displayed a definitive discussion of 
parameters found in the industry standards surveyed. The four standards that are selected 
in this research to apply to QKD are the Common Criteria, FIPS 140-2, DoD Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria and the ETSI QKD standards. These are the 
minimum that should be considered for high level discussions. When developing more 
detailed architecture, additional standards will need to be considered. 
 By conducting a review of security requirements found in the above mentioned 
documents, the six step systems architecture process and DoDAFv2.0 guidelines provide 
prototypical system documentation for further research and development. The views 
developed in this thesis should be considered the minimum architectural models for 
security considerations not a complete meta-model for analysis. The Use Cases and State 
Transition Diagram provide a reference for main system functions and states. The critical 
components are documented in a block diagram and by delving additional layers into this 
view the specific hardware components used in any particular implementation can be 
 70 
identified. It can then be determined how they differ from hardware presented in security 
proofs. At the level developed for this thesis, we see that the single photon detector is in 
fact an avalanche photo-diode which functions probabilistically based on several 
parameters. We also see the laser which is incapable of generating the single photon 
required by security proofs. These are two major components defined differently from the 
security proofs. The common parameters to consider are identified in the Use Cases. 
5.3 Research Limitations 
By utilizing this process, a top level architecture prototype was developed that 
met 84% of the standards considered. The 16% not met can be attributed to the several 
shortfalls. A large portion of the standards not met were software concerns. This thesis 
focused primarily on hardware and processes; however, in an actual system 
implementation software integrity and functionality will be important and logical 
interfaces must be defined.  
From a content analysis perspective, the scope of this thesis is incredibly 
restrictive. Only analyzing 10 research papers against four standards is a relatively small 
sampling of content to review. A larger sampling would hold more meaning, but would 
be difficult to accomplish within the constraints of this thesis.  
Architecturally, no actual or simulated QKD system was analyzed to determine 
accuracy of architecture. The architecture was left vague for scoping purposes, but means 
that simulation or testing is impossible. Additionally, because QKD limitations and 
vulnerabilities stem from real world implementation, not having test documentation from 
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a physical system in its actual operational environment severely limits the effectiveness 
of an architectural analysis. 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
I recommend the limitations within the standards presented by this research be 
addressed further. The four standards analyzed above do apply and should be used when 
building a QKD system they are not a perfect fit. There are strengths and weaknesses 
within each criteria chosen. 
 The intent of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria definitely applies 
to QKD. However, as this document has been superseded by more updated standards 
such as the Common Criteria, this should only be used for academic consideration of 
older systems.  
The Common Criteria are designed to be flexible and allow a range of security 
concerns to be looked at. They provide a methodology for evaluating the security of a 
system. As such, they are useful when developing and examining QKD. If used, their 
flexibility should be utilized and they should be tailored where applicable. The tailoring 
of the Common Criteria will need to consider the specific implementation of QKD being 
evaluated as various implementations of QKD differ in greatly in system setup and 
needed security level. The Common Criteria, however, do not address the unique 
physical components or probabilistic security nature of QKD.  
FIPS 140-2 as a federal cryptographic standard is very applicable to QKD, but 
will need to be tailored based on the implementation and use of the specific QKD system 
being evaluated. For example, guidance applying to use of public keys may not be 
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relevant to QKD and therefore not need to be considered. It provides a suite of tests with 
four security levels in regards to physical security, key management, roles and services, 
etc. FIPS 140-2, like the Common Criteria, does not address the unique nature of QKD 
security. 
As the ETSI standards were created specifically for QKD modules, they are the 
most relevant. They address known parameters of the system and major components as 
well as discuss QKD specific protocols for key generation. However, they are not 
sufficient to evaluate the security of a system. For example, a stated goal within the QKD 
Security Proofs standard is to, “clarify which parameters need to be monitored 
continuously or periodically to assure the generation of a secret key for the different 
security levels [4].” The document provides needed discussion of parameters that affect 
security, but does not quantify the security level or address how it should be validated. 
Needed security can vary greatly based on system purpose, but thresholds are not given 
within the QKD Security Proofs document to quantify the various levels. 
Additionally, processes for dealing with multiple security levels within a QKD 
module should be defined. For example, the interface between the quantum and classical 
modules in a QKD system must be carefully reviewed. Due to the nature of the system, a 
quantum module operates at a higher security level than a classical module. Exactly how 
the security levels differ and what restrictions should apply as they are forced to interact 
needs to be addressed in detail. The standards reviewed do not address this particular 
concern that becomes apparent as the system is developed in more detail. 
A formal methodology is needed to quantify the security of real-world QKD 
systems and components and provide for independent testing and validation. Standards 
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could be developed that rigorously define the security within components, protocols and 
software used in QKD. For example, the laser that generates a single photon, the detector 
designed to detect a single photon, the configuration of the quantum channel are three 
main physical areas that are key to QKD security. The ETSI standards provide guidance 
as to how these should be implemented, but for independent validation, calibration, 
testing and other concerns, there may be additional standards that should be met. 
Developing a measurement framework and explicitly defining component and system 
parameters is a step that has begun to be taken, but must be developed further. There is an 
ongoing effort that began in September 2011 designed to provide a measurement 
framework. Metrology for Industrial Quantum Communications is attempting to define 
the operating parameters for photon emitters, quantum channels and photon receivers 
used in QKD [32]. This provides a start to developing independent verification and 
definition of security.  
I also recommend that future research utilize all existing applicable security 
standards for both cryptographic modules and trusted systems. This research is limited to 
four; however, there is a much larger body of knowledge that should be addressed in any 
practical attempt to develop QKD. These standards will need to be reviewed and tailored 
for the operation and configuration selected by each implementation. Some standards to 
consider are: NIST 800 series, ISO 27000 series, FIPS Publication 199 Standards for 
Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and other 
protocol specific standards published by the National Institutes for Standards and 
Technology. 
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The final recommendation derived from this research is to further develop a 
coherent integrated QKD architecture. A coherent and integrated architecture would 
utilize the industry security standards considered in this research as well as those omitted 
due to scoping limitations and help identify areas where standards fall short or need to be 
tailored for unique QKD concerns. Its formal process would generate a discussion of the 
future research concerns above and assist in testing and analysis of the many varied QKD 
configurations. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter provides a summary of research conducted in this thesis. It concludes 
that IT industry standards are not considered in QKD research publications. It enumerates 
the limitations found in this research and it provides discussion for future research, both 
for industry standards and for architectural development. 
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
 
BB84 – Bennett and Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol. A quantum 
key distribution protocol using single, polarized photons to encode information. 
DoDAF v2.0 – Department of Defense Architecture Framework v2.0. The 
overarching framework and conceptual model enabling development of architectures for 
Department of Defense decision makers. 
ETSI – European Telecommunications Standards Institute. International body 
that seeks to produce globally applicable standards for Information and Communications 
Technology. 
IT – Information Technology 
CC – Common Criteria. Part of an international technical basis by which 
Information Technology products can be evaluated by independent laboratories to 
determine fulfillment of security properties. 
CEM – Common Methodology for Information Technology System Evaluation. 
Part of an international technical basis by which Information Technology products can be 
evaluated by independent laboratories to determine fulfillment of security properties. 
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standards. United States standards issued 
by the National Institute for Standards and Technology and approved by the Secretary of 
Commerce. 
AV – DoDAF v2.0 All Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains two models that 
describe the overarching aspects of the architectural context. 
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OV - DoDAF v2.0 Operational Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains nine models 
that describes operational scenarios and activities requirements. 
SV - DoDAF v2.0 Systems Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains 13 models that 
describe the design for solutions by articulating their systems, interconnectivity, and 
context. 
StdV - DoDAF v2.0 Standards Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains two models 
that articulate the present and projected policies, standards and guidance. 
QBER – Quantum Bit Error Rate. The ratio of an error rate to the key rate.  
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Appendix B: Example In Depth Standards Requirements 
The standards presented in this thesis were largely abridged due to constraints 
caused by the need to scope this effort. Below is an example of what a more in depth look 
would require for the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. Of note are the 
differing levels of security evaluation requirements based on the security concerns of the 
system. An in depth look would require classifying each major module of the QKD 
system and addressing them based on the security required within each subsystem. This 
greatly increases the complexity of the interactions, interfaces, and related analysis 
required. 
Discretionary Access Control (C1): The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) shall define 
and control access between named users and named objects (e.g., files and 
programs) in the ADP system.  The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public 
controls, access control lists) shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those 
objects by named individuals or defined groups or both. 
  
Identification and Authentication (C1): The TCB shall require users to identify 
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is 
expected to mediate.  Furthermore, the TCB shall use a protected mechanism (e.g., 
passwords) to authenticate the user's identity.The TCB shall protect authentication 
data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. 
 
  
System Architecture (C1): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution 
protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or 
data structures). Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset of the 
subjects and objects in the ADP system. 
System Integrity (C1): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can 
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and 
firmware elements of the TCB. 
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Security Testing (C1):  The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested 
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. Testing shall be done to 
assure that there are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to bypass or 
otherwise defeat the security protection mechanisms of the TCB. (See the Security 
Testing Guidelines.) 
 Security Features User's Guide (C1): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user 
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB, 
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another. 
 Trusted Facility Manual (C1): A manual addressed to the ADP System Administrator 
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when 
running a secure facility. 
Test Documentation (C1): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a 
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the the 
security mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' functional 
testing. 
Design Documentation (C1): Documentation shall be available that provides a 
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how 
this philosophy is translated into the TCB.  If the TCB is composed of distinct 
modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described. 
Discretionary Access Control (C2): The TCB shall define and control access 
between named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP 
system.  The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls, access 
control lists) shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by 
named individuals, or defined groups of individuals, or by both, and shall provide 
controls to limit propagation of access rights.  The discretionary access control 
mechanism shall, either by explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are 
protected from unauthorized access. These access controls shall be capable of 
including or excluding access to the granularity of a single user.  Access permission 
to an object by users not already possessing access permission shall only be 
assigned by authorized users. 
 Object Reuse (C2):  All authorizations to the information contained within a storage 
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a 
subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects.  No information, including 
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to 
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released 
back to the system. 
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 Identification and Authentication (C2): The TCB shall require users to identify 
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is 
expected to mediate.  Furthermore, the TCB shall use a protected mechanism (e.g., 
passwords) to authenticate the user's identity. The TCB shall protect authentication 
data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user.  The TCB shall be able 
to enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify 
each individual ADP system user.  The TCB  shall also provide the capability of 
associating this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual. 
Audit (C2): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification 
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it 
protects.  The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is 
limited to those who are authorized for audit data.  The TCB shall be able to record 
the following types of events:  use of identification and authentication mechanisms, 
introduction or objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program 
initiation), deletion of objects, and actions taken by   computer operators and system 
administrators and/or system security officers, and other security relevant events.  
For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify:  date and time of the event, 
user, type of event, and success or failure of the event.  For 
identification/authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be 
included in the audit record.  For events that introduce an object into a user's 
address space and for object deletion events the audit record shall include the name 
of the object.  The ADP system administrator shall be able to selectively audit the 
actions of any one or more users based on individual identity. 
 System Architecture (C2):  The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution 
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its 
code or data structures).   Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset 
of the subjects and objects in the ADP system.  The TCB shall isolate the resources 
to be protected so that they are subject to the access control and auditing 
requirements. 
 System Integrity (C2): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can 
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and 
firmware elements of the TCB. 
Security Testing (C2): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested 
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. Testing shall be done to 
assure that there are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to bypass or 
otherwise defeat the security protection mechanisms of the TCB. Testing shall also 
include a search for obvious flaws that would allow violation of resource isolation, or 
that would permit unauthorized access to the audit or authentication data.  (See the 
Security Testing guidelines.) 
 Security Features User's Guide (C2): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user 
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB, 
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another. 
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Trusted Facility Manual (C2): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator 
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when 
running a secure facility.  The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit 
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall 
be given. 
Test Documentation (C2): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a 
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security 
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms’ functional testing. 
 Design Documentation (C2): Documentation shall be available that provides a 
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how 
this philosophy is translated into the TCB.  If the TCB is composed of distinct 
modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described. 
Discretionary Access Control (B1): The TCB shall define and control access between 
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system.   The 
enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls,   access control lists) shall 
allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by named individuals, or 
defined groups  of individuals, or by both, and shall provide controls to limit  
propagation of access rights.  The discretionary access control mechanism shall, 
either by explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from 
unauthorized access.   These access controls shall be capable of including or 
excluding access to the granularity of a single user.  Access permission to an object 
by users not already possessing access permission shall only be assigned by 
authorized users. 
Object Reuse (B1): All authorizations to the information contained within a storage 
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a 
subject from the TCB's pool   of unused storage objects.  No information, including 
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to 
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released 
back to the system. 
Labels (B1): Sensitivity labels associated with each subject and storage object under 
its control (e.g., process, file, segment, and device) shall be maintained by the TCB.  
These labels shall be used as the basis for mandatory access control decisions.  In 
order to import non-labeled data, the TCB shall request and receive from an 
authorized user the security level of the data, and all such actions shall be auditable 
by the TCB. 
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Label Integrity (B1): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the 
specific subjects or objects with which they are associated.  When exported by the 
TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal 
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported. 
Exportation of Labeled Information (B1): The TCB shall designate each 
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multi level.  Any 
change in this designation shall be done manually and shall be auditable by the 
TCB.  The TCB shall maintain and be able to audit any change in the security level 
or levels associated with a communication channel or I/O device. 
Exportation to Multilevel Devices (B1): When the TCB exports an object to a 
multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be 
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported information 
and shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable form). 
When the TCB exports or imports an object over a   multilevel communication 
channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing 
between the sensitivity labels and the associated information that is sent or received. 
Exportation to Single-Level Devices (B1):  Single-level I/O devices and single-level 
communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of the 
information they process.  However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which 
the TCb and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single 
security level of information imported or exported via single-level communication 
channels or I/O devices. 
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Mandatory Access Control (B1): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control 
policy over all subjects and storage objects under its control (e.g., processes, files, 
segments, devices).  These subjects and objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels 
that are a combination of hierarchical classification levels and non-hierarchical 
categories, and the labels shall be used as the basis for mandatory access control 
decisions.  The TCB shall be able to support two or more such security levels. (See 
the Mandatory Access Control Guidelines.)  The following requirements shall hold for 
all accesses between subjects and objects controlled by the TCB:  a subject can 
read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level is 
greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security level 
and the non- hierarchical categories in the subject's security level include all the non-
hierarchical categories in the object's security level.  A subject can write an object 
only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level is less than or 
equal to the hierarchical classification in the object’s security level and all the non-
hierarchical categories in the subject's security level are included in the non-
hierarchical categories in the object's security level.  Identification and authentication 
data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to ensure that 
the security level and authorization of subjects external to the TCB that may be 
created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the clearance and 
authorization of that user. 
Identification and Authentication (B1): The TCB shall require users to identify 
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is 
expected to mediate.  Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication data that 
includes information for verifying the identity of individual users (e.g., passwords) as 
well as information for determining the clearance and authorizations or individual 
users.  This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to 
ensure that the security level and authorizations of subjects external to the TCB that 
may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the 
clearance and authorization of that user.  The TCB shall protect authentication data 
so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user.  The TCB shall be able to 
enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each 
individual ADP system user.  The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating 
this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual. 
Audit (B1): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification 
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it 
protects.  The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is 
limited to those who are authorized for audit data.  The TCB shall be able to record 
the following types of events: use of identification and authentication mechanisms, 
introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), 
deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and system 
administrators and/or system security officers and other security relevant events.  
The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-readable output 
markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of 
the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event.  For 
identification/authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be 
included in the audit record.  For events that introduce an object into a user’s 
address space and for object deletion events the audit record shall include the name 
of the object and the object's security level.  The ADP system administrator shall be 
able to selectively audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual 
identity and/or object security level. 
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System Architecture (B1): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution 
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its 
code or data structures).  Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset 
of the subjects and objects in the ADP system.  The TCB shall maintain process 
isolation through the provision of distinct address spaces under its control.  The TCB 
shall isolate the resources to be protected so that they are subject to the access 
control and auditing requirements. 
System Integrity (B1): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can 
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and 
firmware elements of the TCB. 
Security Testing (B1): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested 
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation.  A team of individuals 
who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its 
design documentation, source code, and object code to thorough analysis and 
testing.  Their objectives shall be:  to uncover all design and implementation flaws 
that would   permit a subject external to the TCB to read, change, or delete data 
normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by the 
TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so) is able to 
cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to communications 
initiated by other users.  All discovered flaws shall be removed or   neutralized and 
the TCB retested to demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws 
have not been   introduced.  (See the Security Testing Guidelines.) 
Design Specification and Verification (B1): An informal or formal model of the 
security policy supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the 
ADP system and demonstrated to be consistent with its axioms. 
Security Features User's Guide (B1): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user 
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB, 
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another. 
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Trusted Facility Manual (B1):  A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator 
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when 
running a secure facility.  The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit 
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall 
be given.  The manual shall describe the operator and administrator functions related 
to security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user.  It shall provide 
guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of the 
system, how they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility 
procedures, warnings, and privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate 
the facility in a secure manner. 
Test Documentation (B1): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a 
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security 
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms’ functional testing. 
Design Documentation (B1): Documentation shall be available that provides a 
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how 
this philosophy is translated into the TCB.  If the TCB is composed of distinct 
modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described.  An informal or 
formal description of the security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be 
available and an explanation provided to show that it is sufficient to enforce the 
security policy.  The specific TCB protection mechanisms shall be identified and an 
explanation given to show that they satisfy the model. 
Discretionary Access Control (B2): The TCB shall define and control access between 
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system. The 
enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls,  access control lists) shall 
allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by named individuals, or 
defined groups of individuals, or by both, and shall provide controls   to limit 
propagation of access rights.  The discretionary access control mechanism shall, 
either by explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from 
unauthorized access.  These access controls shall be capable of including or 
excluding access to the granularity of a single user.  Access permission to an object 
by users not already possessing access permission shall only be assigned by 
authorized users. 
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Object Reuse (B2): All authorizations to the information contained within a storage 
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a 
subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects.  No information, including 
encrypted   representations of information, produced by a prior subject’s actions is to 
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released 
back to the system. 
Labels (B2): Sensitivity labels associated with each ADP system resource (e.g., 
subject, storage object, ROM) that is directly or indirectly accessible by subjects 
external to the TCB shall be maintained by the TCB.  These labels shall be used as 
the basis for mandatory access control decisions.  In order to import non-labeled 
data, the TCB shall request and receive from an authorized user the security level of 
the data, and all such actions shall be auditable by the TCB. 
Label Integrity (B2): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the 
specific subjects or objects with which they are associated.  When exported by the 
TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal 
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported. 
Exportation of Labeled Information (B2): The TCB shall designate each 
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multilevel.  Any 
change in this designation shall be done manually and shall be auditable by the 
TCB.  The TCB shall maintain and be able to audit any change in the security level 
or levels associated with a communication channel or   I/O device. 
Exportation to Multilevel Devices (B1): When the TCB exports an object to a 
multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be 
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported information 
and shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable form).  
When the TCB exports or imports an object over a multilevel communication 
channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing 
between the sensitivity labels and the associated information that is sent or received. 
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Exportation to Single-Level Devices (B1):  Single-level I/O devices and single-level 
communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of the 
information they process.  However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which 
the TCb and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single 
security level of information imported or exported via single-level communication 
channels or I/O devices. 
Subject Sensitivity Labels (B2): The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal user of 
each change in the security level associated with that user during an interactive 
session.  A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of 
the subject's complete sensitivity label. 
Device Labels (B2): The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and 
maximum security levels to all attached physical devices.  These security levels shall 
be used by the TCB to enforce constraints imposed by the physical environments in 
which the devices are located. 
Mandatory Access Control (B2): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control 
policy over all resources (i.e., subjects, storage objects, and I/O devices that are 
directly or indirectly accessible by subjects external to the TCB.  These subjects and 
objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels that are a combination of hierarchical 
classification levels and non-hierarchical categories, and the labels shall be used as 
the basis for mandatory access control decisions.  The TCB shall be able to support 
two or more such security levels.  (See the Mandatory Access Control guidelines.) 
The following requirements shall hold for all accesses between All subjects external 
to the TCB and all objects directly or  indirectly accessible by these subjects:  A 
subject can read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's 
security level is greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's 
security level and the non- hierarchical categories in the subject's security level 
include all the non-hierarchical categories in the object's security level.  A subject 
can write an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level 
is less than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security level and 
all the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level are included in the 
non-hierarchical categories in the object's security level.  Identification and 
authentication data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and 
to ensure that the security level and authorization of subjects external to the TCB 
that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the 
clearance and authorization of that user. 
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Identification and Authentication (B2): The TCB shall require users to identify 
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is 
expected to mediate.  Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication data that 
includes information for verifying the identity of individual users (e.g., passwords) as 
well as information for determining the clearance and authorizations of individual 
users.  This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to 
ensure that the security level and authorizations of subjects external to the TCB that 
may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the 
clearance and authorization of that user.  The TCB shall protect authentication data 
so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user.  The TCB shall be able to 
enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each 
individual ADP system user.  The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating 
this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual. 
Trusted Path (B2): The TCB shall support a trusted communication path between 
itself and user for initial login and authentication.  Communications via this path shall 
be initiated exclusively by a user. 
Audit (B2):  The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification 
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it 
protects.  The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is 
limited to those who are authorized for audit data.  The TCB shall be able to record 
the following types of events: use of identification and authentication mechanisms, 
introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), 
deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and system 
administrators and/or system security officers, and other security relevant events.  
The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-readable output 
markings.  For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify:  date and time of 
the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event.  For identification/ 
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the 
audit record.  For events that introduce an object into a user's address space and for 
object deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object and the 
object's security level.  The ADP system administrator shall be able to selectively 
audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual identity and/or object 
security level.  The TCB shall be able to audit the identified events that may be used 
in the exploitation of covert storage channels. 
System Architecture (B2): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution 
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its 
code or data structures). The TCB shall maintain process isolation through the 
provision of distinct address spaces under its control. The TCB shall be internally 
structured into well-defined largely independent modules.  It shall make effective use 
of available hardware to separate those elements that are protection-critical from 
those that are not.  The TCB modules shall be designed such that the principle of 
least privilege is enforced.  Features in hardware, such as segmentation, shall be 
used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely: 
readable, writeable).  The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and 
all elements of the TCB identified. 
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System Integrity (B2): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can 
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and 
firmware elements of the TCB. 
Covert Channel Analysis (B2): The system developer shall conduct a thorough 
search for covert storage channels and make a determination (either by actual 
measurement or by engineering estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each 
identified channel.  (See the covert channels guideline section.) 
Trusted Facility Management (B2): The TCB shall support separate operator and 
administrator functions. 
Security Testing (B2):  The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested 
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation.  A team of individuals 
who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its 
design documentation, source code, and object code to thorough analysis and 
testing.  Their objectives shall be:  to uncover all design and implementation flaws 
that would permit a subject external to the TCB to read, change, or delete data 
normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by the 
TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so) is able to 
cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to communications 
initiated by other users.  The TCB shall be found relatively resistant to penetration.  
All discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to demonstrate that 
they have been   eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced.  Testing 
shall demonstrate that the TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive top-
level specification.  (See the Security Testing Guidelines.) 
Design Specification and Verification (B2): A formal model of the security policy 
supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the ADP system that 
is proven consistent with its axioms.  A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of 
the TCB shall be maintained that completely and accurately describes the TCB in 
terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects.  It shall be shown to be an 
accurate description of the TCB interface. 
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Configuration Management (B2): During development and maintenance of the TCB, 
a configuration management system shall be in place that maintains control of 
changes to the descriptive top-level specification, other design data, implementation 
documentation, and source code, the running version of the object code, and test 
fixtures and documentation.  The configuration management system shall assure a 
consistent mapping among all documentation and code associated with   the current 
version of the TCB.  Tools shall be provided for generation of a new version of the 
TCB from source code.  Also available shall be tools for comparing a newly 
generated version with the previous TCB version in order to ascertain that only the 
intended changes have been made in the code that will actually be used as the new 
version of the TCB. 
Security Features User's Guide (B2): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user 
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB, 
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another. 
Trusted Facility Manual (B2): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator 
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when 
running a secure facility.  The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit 
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall 
be given.  The manual shall describe the operator and administrator functions related 
to security, to include   changing the security characteristics of a user.  It shall 
provide guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of 
the system, how they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility 
procedures, warnings, and privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate 
the facility in a secure manner.  The TCB modules that contain    the reference 
validation mechanism shall be identified.  The procedures for secure generation of a 
new TCB from source after modification of any modules in the TCB shall be 
described. 
Test Documentation (B2):  The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a 
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security 
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' functional testing.  
It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce 
covert channel bandwidths. 
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Design Documentation (B2):  Documentation shall be available that provides a 
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how 
this philosophy is translated into the TCB.  The  interfaces between the TCB 
modules shall be described.  A  formal description of the security policy model 
enforced by the TCB shall be available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the 
security policy.  The specific TCB protection   mechanisms shall be identified and an 
explanation given to show that they satisfy the model.  The descriptive top-level 
specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB 
interface.  Documentation shall describe how the TCB implements the reference 
monitor concept and give  an explanation why it is tamper resistant, cannot be 
bypassed, and is correctly implemented.  Documentation shall describe how  the 
TCB is structured to facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege.  This 
documentation shall also present the results of the covert channel analysis and the 
tradeoffs involved in  restricting the channels.  All auditable events that may be  used 
in the exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be identified.  The 
bandwidths of known covert storage channels  the use of which is not detectable by 
the auditing mechanisms,  shall be provided.  (See the Covert Channel Guideline 
section.) 
Discretionary Access Control (B3): The TCB shall define and control access between 
named users and  named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system.  The 
enforcement mechanism (e.g., access control lists) shall allow users to specify and 
control sharing of those objects,  and shall provide controls to limit propagation of 
access rights.  The discretionary access control mechanism shall,  either by explicit 
user action or by default, provide that  objects are protected from unauthorized 
access.  These access controls shall be capable of specifying, for each named 
object,  a list of named individuals and a list of groups of named  individuals with 
their respective modes of access to that object.  Furthermore, for each such named 
object, it shall be possible to specify a list of named individuals and a list of  groups 
of named individuals for which no access to the object is  to be given.  Access 
permission to an object by users not  already possessing access permission shall 
only be assigned by authorized users. 
Object Reuse (B3): All authorizations to the information contained within a  storage 
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment,  allocation or reallocation to a 
subject from the TCB's pool   of unused storage objects.  No information, including   
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior  subjects actions is to 
be available to any subject that obtains  access to an object that has been released 
back to the system. 
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Labels (B3): Sensitivity labels associated with each ADP system resource (e.g., 
subject, storage object, ROM) that is directly or indirectly accessible by subjects 
external to the TCB shall be maintained by the TCB.  These labels shall be used as 
the basis for mandatory access control decisions.  In order to import  non-labeled 
data, the TCB shall request and receive from an authorized user the security level of 
the data, and all such actions shall be auditable by the TCB. 
Label Integrity (B3): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the 
specific subjects or objects with which they are associated.  When exported by the 
TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal 
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported. 
Exportation of Labeled Information (B3): The TCB shall designate each 
communication channel and  I/O device as either single-level or multilevel.  An  
change in this designation shall be done manually and  shall be auditable by the 
TCB.  The TCB shall maintain and be able to audit any change in the security level  
or levels associated with a communication channel or  I/O device. 
Exportation to Multilevel Devices (B3): When the TCB exports an object to a 
multilevel I/O  device, the sensitivity label associated with that  object shall also be 
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported   
information and shall be in the same form (i.e.,   machine-readable or human-
readable form).  When the TCB exports or imports an object over a multilevel 
communication channel, the protocol   used on that channel shall provide for the  
unambiguous pairing between the sensitivity labels and the associated information 
that is sent or received. 
Exportation to Single-Level Devices (B3): Single-level I/O devices and single-level  
communication channels are not required to   maintain the sensitivity labels of the 
information they process.  However, the TCB shall include a   mechanism by which 
the TCB and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single 
security level of information imported or exported via single-level communication 
channels or I/O  devices. 
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Subject Sensitivity Labels (B3): The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal user of 
each change in the security level associated with that user during an interactive 
session.  A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of 
the subject's complete sensitivity label. 
Device Labels (B3): The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and 
maximum security levels to all attached physical devices. These security levels shall 
be used by the TCB to enforce constraints imposed by the physical environments in 
which the devices are located. 
Mandatory Access Control (B3): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control 
policy over  all resources (i.e., subjects, storage objects, and I/O  devices) that are 
directly or indirectly accessible by subjects external to the TCB.  These subjects and 
objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels that are a combination of  hierarchical 
classification levels and non-hierarchical  categories, and the labels shall be used as 
the basis for   mandatory access control decisions.  The TCB shall be able to support 
two or more such security levels.  (See the Mandatory Access Control guidelines.)  
The following requirements shall hold for all accesses between all subjects external 
to the TCB  and all objects directly or indirectly accessible by these subjects: A 
subject can read an object only if the hierarchical  classification in the subject's 
security level is greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's 
security level and the non-hierarchical categories in the  subject's security level 
include all the non-hierarchical categories in the object's security level.  A subject 
can write an object only if the hierarchical classification in the   subject's security 
level is less than or equal to the  hierarchical classification in the object's security 
level and  all the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security   level are 
included in the non- hierarchical categories in the   object's security level.  
Identification and authentication  data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the 
user's  identity and to ensure that the security level and authorization of subjects 
external to the TCB that may be created  to act on behalf of the individual user are 
dominated by the clearance and authorization of that user. 
Identification and Authentication (B3): The TCB shall require users to identify 
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is 
expected to mediate.  Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication  data that 
includes information for verifying the identity of  individual users (e.g., passwords) as 
well as information for determining the clearance and authorizations of individual 
users.  This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the  user's identity and to 
ensure that the security level and    authorizations of subjects external to the TCB 
that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the 
clearance and authorization of that user.  The TCB shall  protect authentication data 
so that it cannot be accessed by any  unauthorized user.  The TCB shall be able to 
enforce individual  accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify  each 
individual ADP system user.  The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating 
this identity with all auditable  actions taken by that individual. 
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Trusted Path (B3): The TCB shall support a trusted communication path   between 
itself and users for use when a positive TCB-to-  user connection is required (e.g., 
login, change subject  security level).  Communications via this trusted path shall be 
activated exclusively by a user of the TCB and   shall be logically isolated and 
unmistakably  distinguishable from other paths. 
Audit (B3):   The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from  
modification or unauthorized access or destruction an audit  trail of accesses to the 
objects it protects.  The audit data  shall be protected by the TCB so that read 
access to it is limited to those who are authorized for audit data.  The TCB shall be 
able to record the following types of events: use of identification and authentication 
mechanisms, introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, 
program  initiation), deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and 
system administrators and/or system security  officers and other security relevant 
events.  The TCB shall also  be able to audit any override of human-readable output 
markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify:  date and time of 
the event, user, type of event, and success or  failure of the event.  For 
identification/authentication events  the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be 
included in the audit record.  For events that introduce an object into a  user's 
address space and for object deletion events the audit record shall include the name 
of the object and the object's security level.  The ADP system administrator shall be 
able to  selectively audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual 
identity and/or object security level.  The TCB shall be able to audit the identified 
events that may be used in the exploitation of covert storage channels.  The TCB 
shall contain a mechanism that is able to monitor the occurrence or accumulation of 
security auditable events that may indicate an  imminent violation of security policy.  
This mechanism shall be able to immediately notify the security administrator when 
thresholds are exceeded, and if the occurrence or accumulation of these security 
relevant events continues, the system shall  take the least disruptive action to 
terminate the event. 
System Architecture (B3): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution  
that protects it from external interference or tampering  (e.g., by modification of its 
code or data structures). The TCB shall maintain process isolation through the 
provision of distinct address spaces under its control.  The TCB shall be internally 
structured into well-defined  largely independent modules.  It shall make effective 
use  of available hardware to separate those elements that are protection-critical 
from those that are not.  The TCB  modules shall be designed such that the principle 
of  least privilege is enforced.  Features in hardware, such  as segmentation, shall be 
used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:  
readable, writeable).  The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and 
all elements of the TCB  identified.  The TCB shall be designed and structured to use 
a complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism  with precisely defined 
semantics.  This mechanism shall play a central role in enforcing the internal 
structuring   of the TCB and the system.  The TCB shall incorporate significant use of 
layering, abstraction and data hiding.  Significant system engineering shall be 
directed toward   minimizing the complexity of the TCB and excluding from  the TCB 
modules that are not protection-critical. 
System Integrity (B3): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that  can 
be used to periodically validate the correct  operation of the on-site hardware and 
firmware elements  of the TCB. 
 94 
Covert Channel Analysis (B3): The system developer shall conduct a thorough 
search for  covert channels and make a determination (either by   actual 
measurement or by engineering estimation) of the  maximum bandwidth of each 
identified channel.  (See the   Covert Channels Guideline section.) 
Trusted Facility Management (B3): The TCB shall support separate operator and 
administrator functions.  The functions performed in the role of a   security 
administrator shall be identified.  The ADP   system administrative personnel shall 
only be able to  perform security administrator functions after taking a  distinct 
auditable action to assume the security  administrator role on the ADP system.  Non-
security functions that can be performed in the security  administration role shall be 
limited strictly to those   essential to performing the security role effectively. 
Trusted Recovery (B3): Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided to assure  
that, after an ADP system failure or other discontinuity,  recovery without a protection 
compromise is obtained. 
Security Testing (B3): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested 
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation.  A team of individuals 
who thoroughly understand the   specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its  
design documentation, source code, and object code to  thorough analysis and 
testing.  Their objectives shall   be: to uncover all design and implementation flaws 
would permit a subject external to the TCB to read,   change, or delete data normally 
denied under the   mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by   the TCB; 
as well as to assure that no subject (without  authorization to do so) is able to cause 
the TCB to enter   a state such that it is unable to respond to   communications 
initiated by other users.  The TCB shall  be found resistant to penetration.  All 
discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to demonstrate  that they 
have been eliminated and that new flaws have  not been introduced.  Testing shall 
demonstrate that the  TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive top-level 
specification.  (See the Security Testing   Guidelines.)  No design flaws and no more 
than a few correctable implementation flaws may be found during  testing and there 
shall be reasonable confidence that few remain. 
Design Specification and Verification (B3): A formal model of the security policy 
supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the ADP system that 
is proven consistent with its axioms.  A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of 
the TCB shall be maintained that completely and accurately  describes the TCB in 
terms of exceptions, error messages,   and effects.  It shall be shown to be an 
accurate description of the TCB interface.  A convincing argument shall be given that 
the DTLS is consistent with the model. 
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Configuration Management (B3): During development and maintenance of the TCB, 
a  configuration management system shall be in place that  maintains control of 
changes to the descriptive top-level  specification, other design data, implementation   
documentation, source code, the running version of the object code, and test fixtures 
and documentation.  The  configuration management system shall assure a 
consistent    mapping among all documentation and code associated with   the 
current version of the TCB.  Tools shall be provided   for generation of a new version 
of the TCB from source   code.  Also available shall be tools for comparing a   newly 
generated version with the previous TCB version in      order to ascertain that only 
the intended changes have    been made in the code that will actually be used as the 
new version of the TCB. 
Security Features User's Guide (B3): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user 
documentation  shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,  
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another. 
Trusted Facility Manual (B3): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator 
shall   present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when 
running a secure facility.  The procedures for  examining and maintaining the audit 
files as well as the  detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event    shall 
be given.  The manual shall describe the operator and      administrator functions 
related to security, to include    changing the security characteristics of a user.  It 
shall   provide guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the    protection 
features of the system, how they interact, how to    securely generate a new TCB, 
and facility procedures, warnings,  and privileges that need to be controlled in order 
to operate     the facility in a secure manner.  The TCB modules that contain   the 
reference validation mechanism shall be identified.  The   procedures for secure 
generation of a new TCB from source after  modification of any modules in the TCB 
shall be described.  It   shall include the procedures to ensure that the system is   
initially started in a secure manner.  Procedures shall also be  included to resume 
secure system operation after any lapse in  system operation. 
Test Documentation (B3): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a 
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the  security 
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security  mechanisms' functional testing.  
It shall include results of  testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce 
covert channel bandwidths. 
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Design Documentation (B3): Documentation shall be available that provides a 
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation  of how 
this philosophy is translated into the TCB.  The   interfaces between the TCB 
modules shall be described.  A  formal description of the security policy model 
enforced by the TCB shall be available and proven that it is sufficient to   enforce the 
security policy.  The specific TCB protection   mechanisms shall be identified and an 
explanation given to show   that they satisfy the model.  The descriptive top-level   
specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an accurate    description of the TCB 
interface.  Documentation shall describe  how the TCB implements the reference 
monitor concept and give     an explanation why it is tamper resistant, cannot be 
bypassed,   and is correctly implemented.  The TCB implementation (i.e., in 
hardware, firmware, and software) shall be informally shown to  be consistent with 
the DTLS.  The elements of the DTLS shall be  shown, using informal techniques, to 
correspond to the elements  of the TCB.  Documentation shall describe how the TCB 
is structured to facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege. This documentation 
shall also present the results of the covert channel analysis and the tradeoffs 
involved in restricting the channels.  All auditable events that may be used in the 
exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be  identified.  The bandwidths of 
known covert storage channels, the use of which is not detectable by the auditing 
mechanisms,   shall be provided.  (See the Covert Channel Guideline section. 
(A1): A formal model of the security policy must be clearly  identified and 
documented, including a mathematical proof  that the model is consistent with its 
axioms and is  sufficient to support the security policy. 
(A1): An (Formal Top Level Specification) FTLS must be produced that includes 
abstract definitions  of the functions the TCB performs and of the hardware and/or 
firmware mechanisms that are used to support separate execution domains. 
(A1): The FTLS of the TCB must be shown to be consistent with the  model by 
formal techniques where possible (i.e., where  verification tools exist) and informal 
ones otherwise. 
(A1): The TCB implementation (i.e., in hardware, firmware, and  software) must be 
informally shown to be consistent with the FTLS.  The elements of the FTLS must be 
shown, using  informal techniques, to correspond to the elements of the  TCB.  The 
FTLS must express the unified protection mechanism   required to satisfy the 
security policy, and it is the   elements of this protection mechanism that are mapped 
to the  elements of the TCB. 
(A1): Formal analysis techniques must be used to identify and  analyze covert 
channels.  Informal techniques may be used to  identify covert timing channels.  The 
continued existence of  identified covert channels in the system must be justified. 
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Discretionary Access Control (A1): The TCB shall define and control access between 
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system.    The 
enforcement mechanism (e.g., access control lists) shall   allow users to specify and 
control sharing of those objects, and shall provide controls to limit propagation of 
access  rights.  The discretionary access control mechanism shall, either by explicit 
user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from unauthorized 
access.  These access  controls shall be capable of specifying, for each named 
object,  a list of named individuals and a list of groups of named  individuals with 
their respective modes of access to that object.  Furthermore, for each such named 
object, it shall be possible to specify a list of named individuals and a list of   groups 
of named individuals for which no access to the object is to be given.  Access 
permission to an object by users not  already possessing access permission shall 
only be assigned by authorized users. 
Object Reuse (A1): All authorizations to the information contained within a    storage 
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment,  allocation or reallocation to a 
subject from the TCB's pool  of unused storage objects.  No information, including 
encrypted    representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to 
be available to any subject that obtains access  to an object that has been released 
back to the system. 
Labels (A1): Sensitivity labels associated with each ADP system resource  (e.g., 
subject, storage object, ROM) that is directly or  indirectly accessible by subjects 
external to the TCB shall be  maintained by the TCB.  These labels shall be used as 
the basis  for mandatory access control decisions.  In order to import   non-labeled 
data, the TCB shall request and receive from an   authorized user the security level 
of the data, and all such  actions shall be auditable by the TCB. 
Label Integrity (A1): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security  levels of 
the specific subjects or objects with which   they are associated.  When exported by 
the TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal 
labels and shall be associated   with the information being exported. 
Exportation of Labeled Information (A1): The TCB shall designate each 
communication channel and  I/O device as either single-level or multilevel.  Any   
change in this designation shall be done manually and  shall be auditable by the 
TCB.  The TCB shall maintain  and be able to audit any change in the security level 
or levels associated with a communication channel or  I/O device. 
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Exportation to Multilevel Devices (A1): When the TCB exports an object to a 
multilevel I/O  device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be 
exported and shall reside on  the same physical medium as the exported  
information and shall be in the same form (i.e.,   machine-readable or human-
readable form).  When   the TCB exports or imports an object over a   multilevel 
communication channel, the protocol   used on that channel shall provide for the 
  unambiguous pairing between the sensitivity labels  and the associated information 
that is sent or     received. 
Exportation to Single Level Devices (A1): Single-level I/O devices and single-level 
  communication channels are not required to    maintain the sensitivity labels of the 
information   they process.  However, the TCB shall include a    mechanism by which 
the TCB and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single  
security level of information imported or exported  via single-level communication 
channels or I/O    devices. 
Subject Sensitivity Labels (A1): The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal user of 
each change in the security level associated with that user    during an interactive 
session.  A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of 
the   subject's complete sensitivity label. 
Device Labels (A1): The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and  
maximum security levels to all attached physical devices.   These security levels 
shall be used by the TCB to enforce constraints imposed by the physical 
environments in which   the devices are located. 
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Mandatory Access Control (A1): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control 
policy over all resources (i.e., subjects, storage objects, and I/O  devices) that are 
directly or indirectly accessible by subjects  external to the TCB.  These subjects and 
objects shall be  assigned sensitivity labels that are a combination of hierarchical 
classification levels and non-hierarchical  categories, and the labels shall be used as 
the basis for  mandatory access control decisions.  The TCB shall be able to  support 
two or more such security levels.  (See the Mandatory  Access Control guidelines.) 
The following requirements shall  hold for all accesses between all subjects external 
to the TCB   and all objects directly or indirectly accessible by these  subjects: A 
subject can read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's 
security level is greater than  or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's  
security level and the non-hierarchical categories in the  subject's security level 
include all the non-hierarchical   categories in the object's security level.  A subject 
can write  an object only if the hierarchical classification in the   subject's security 
level is less than or equal to the  hierarchical classification in the object's security 
level and all the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security  level are 
included in the non- hierarchical categories in the   object's security level.  
Identification and authentication    data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the 
user's  identity and to ensure that the security level and authorization of subjects 
external to the TCB that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are 
dominated by the  clearance and authorization of that user. 
Identification and Authentication (A1): The TCB shall require users to identify 
themselves to it before  beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is 
expected to mediate.  Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication data that 
includes information for verifying the identity of  individual users (e.g., passwords) as 
well as information for   determining the clearance and authorizations of individual 
users.  This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the  user's identity and to 
ensure that the security level and   authorizations of subjects external to the TCB 
that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the 
clearance and authorization of that user.  The TCB shall  protect authentication data 
so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user.  The TCB shall be able to 
enforce individual  accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each 
individual ADP system user.  The TCB shall also provide the  capability of 
associating this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual. 
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Trusted Path (A1): The TCB shall support a trusted communication path between 
itself and users for use when a positive TCB-to-  user connection is required (e.g., 
login, change subject security level).  Communications via this trusted path shall be 
activated exclusively by a user or the TCB and shall be logically isolated and 
unmistakably  distinguishable from other paths. 
Audit (A1): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification 
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit  trail of accesses to the objects it 
protects.  The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is 
limited to those who are authorized for audit data.  The TCB shall be able to record 
the following types of events: use of  identification and authentication mechanisms, 
introduction of  objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program  
initiation), deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer  operators and system 
administrators and/or system security  officers, and other security relevant events.  
The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-readable output  
markings.  For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of 
the event, user, type of event, and  success or failure of the event.  For identification/  
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID)  shall be included in the 
audit record.  For events that  introduce an object into a user's address space and for 
object  deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object and the 
object's security level.  The ADP system    administrator shall be able to selectively 
audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual identity and/or object 
security level.  The TCB shall be able to audit the identified  events that may be used 
in the exploitation of covert storage   channels.  The TCB shall contain a mechanism 
that is able to  monitor the occurrence or accumulation of security auditable events 
that may indicate an imminent violation of security  policy.  This mechanism shall be 
able to immediately notify the security administrator when thresholds are exceeded, 
and, if  the occurrence or accumulation of these security relevant  events continues, 
the system shall take the least disruptive  action to terminate the event. 
System Architecture (A1): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution 
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its 
code or data structures). The TCB shall maintain process isolation through the 
provision of distinct address spaces under its control. The TCB shall be internally 
structured into well-defined largely independent modules.  It shall make effective use 
of available hardware to separate those elements that are  protection-critical from 
those that are not.  The TCB  modules shall be designed such that the principle of   
least privilege is enforced.  Features in hardware, such as segmentation, shall be 
used to support logically   distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:  
readable, writeable).  The user interface to the TCB  shall be completely defined and 
all elements of the TCB  identified.  The TCB shall be designed and structured to use 
a complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism  with precisely defined 
semantics.  This mechanism shall   play a central role in enforcing the internal 
structuring of the TCB and the system.  The TCB shall incorporate significant use of 
layering, abstraction and data hiding. Significant system engineering shall be 
directed toward   minimizing the complexity of the TCB and excluding from the TCB 
modules that are not protection-critical. 
System Integrity (A1): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that  can 
be used to periodically validate the correct   operation of the on-site hardware and 
firmware elements  of the TCB. 
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Covert Channel Analysis (A1): The system developer shall conduct a thorough 
search for covert channels and make a determination (either by  actual 
measurement or by engineering estimation) of the  maximum bandwidth of each 
identified channel.  (See the Covert Channels Guideline section.)  Formal methods 
shall be used in the analysis. 
Trusted Facility Management (A1): The TCB shall support separate operator and 
administrator  functions.  The functions performed in the role of a    security 
administrator shall be identified.  The ADP system administrative personnel shall 
only be able to perform security administrator functions after taking a  distinct 
auditable action to assume the security  administrator role on the ADP system.  Non-
security  functions that can be performed in the security   administration role shall be 
limited strictly to those essential to performing the security role effectively. 
Trusted Recovery (A1): Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided to assure  
that, after an ADP system failure or other discontinuity,  recovery without a protection 
compromise is obtained. 
Security Testing (A1): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested 
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. A team of individuals 
who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its 
design documentation, source code, and object code to  thorough analysis and 
testing.  Their objectives shall    be: to uncover all design and implementation flaws 
that   would permit a subject external to the TCB to read,  change, or delete data 
normally denied under the   mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by    
the TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without  authorization to do so) is able 
to cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to 
communications initiated by other users.  The TCB shall    be found resistant to 
penetration.  All discovered flaws   shall be corrected and the TCB retested to 
demonstrate   that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been 
introduced.  Testing shall demonstrate that theTCB implementation is consistent with 
the formal top-  level specification.  (See the Security Testing  Guidelines.)  No 
design flaws and no more than a few correctable implementation flaws may be found 
during  testing and there shall be reasonable confidence that few  remain.  Manual or 
other mapping of the FTLS to the source code may form a basis for penetration 
testing. 
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Design Specification and Verification (A1): A formal model of the security policy 
supported by the  TCB shall be maintained over the life-cycle of the ADP  system 
that is proven consistent with its axioms.  A  descriptive top-level specification 
(DTLS) of the TCB   shall be maintained that completely and accurately describes 
the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages,   and effects. A formal top-level 
specification (FTLS) of  the TCB shall be maintained that accurately describes the  
TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects.  The DTLS and FTLS shall 
include those components of the TCB that are implemented as hardware and/or 
firmware if  their properties are visible at the TCB interface.  The  FTLS shall be 
shown to be an accurate description of the    TCB interface.  A convincing argument 
shall be given that    the DTLS is consistent with the model and a combination of  
formal and informal techniques shall be used to show that   the FTLS is consistent 
with the model.  This verification   evidence shall be consistent with that provided 
within the  state-of-the-art of the particular computer security center-endorsed formal 
specification and verification  system used.  Manual or other mapping of the FTLS to 
the  TCB source code shall be performed to provide evidence of correct 
implementation. 
Configuration Management (A1): During the entire life-cycle, i.e., during the design, 
development, and maintenance of the TCB, a configuration  management system 
shall be in place for all security-   relevant hardware, firmware, and software that 
maintains control of changes to the formal model, the descriptive  and formal top-
level specifications, other design data,   implementation documentation, source 
code, the running version of the object code, and test fixtures and   documentation.  
The configuration management system shall  assure a consistent mapping among all 
documentation and   code associated with the current version of the TCB. Tools shall 
be provided for generation of a new version  of the TCB from source code.  Also 
available shall be    tools, maintained under strict configuration control, for  
comparing a newly generated version with the previous TCB   version in order to 
ascertain that only the intended  changes have been made in the code that will 
actually be used as the new version of the TCB.  A combination of  technical, 
physical, and procedural safeguards shall be  used to protect from unauthorized 
modification or  destruction the master copy or copies of all material  used to 
generate the TCB. 
Trusted Distribution (A1): A trusted ADP system control and distribution facility shall 
be provided for maintaining the integrity of the  mapping between the master data 
describing the current  version of the TCB and the on-site master copy of thecode for 
the current version.  Procedures (e.g., site  security acceptance testing) shall exist 
for assuring   that the TCb software, firmware, and hardware updates  distributed to 
a customer are exactly as specified by  the master copies. 
Security Features User's Guide (A1):  A single summary, chapter, or manual in user 
documentation  shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,  
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another. 
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Trusted Facility Manual (A1):  A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator 
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be  controlled when 
running a secure facility.  The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit 
files as well as the  detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event  shall 
be given.  The manual shall describe the operator and   administrator functions 
related to security, to include   changing the security characteristics of a user.  It 
shallprovide guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features 
of the system, how they interact, how to  securely generate a new TCB, and facility 
procedures, warnings,  and privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate 
the facility in a secure manner.  The TCB modules that contain  the reference 
validation mechanism shall be identified.  The   procedures for secure generation of 
a new TCB from source after modification of any modules in the TCB shall be 
described.  It shall include the procedures to ensure that the system is   initially 
started in a secure manner.  Procedures shall also be  included to resume secure 
system operation after any lapse in  system operation.   
Test Documentation (A1): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a 
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security 
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security  mechanisms' functional testing.  
It shall include results of   testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce 
covertchannel bandwidths.  The results of the mapping between the formal top-level 
specification and the TCB source code shall be given. 
Design Documentation (A1):  Documentation shall be available that provides a 
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation  of how 
this philosophy is translated into the TCB.  The   interfaces between the TCB 
modules shall be described.  A formal description of the security policy model 
enforced by the  TCB shall be available and proven that it is sufficient to  enforce the 
security policy.  The specific TCB protection  mechanisms shall be identified and an 
explanation given to show   that they satisfy the model.  The descriptive top-level 
speci-  fication (DTLS) shall be shown to be an accurate description of  the TCB 
interface.  Documentation shall describe how the TCB  implements the reference 
monitor concept and give an explana- tion why it is tamper resistant, cannot be 
bypassed, and  is correctly implemented.  The TCB implementation (i.e., in 
hardware, firmware, and software) shall be informally shown to  be consistent with 
the formal top-level specification (FTLS). The elements of the FTLS shall be shown, 
using informal  techniques, to correspond to the elements of the TCB.   
Documentation shall describe how the TCB is structured tofacilitate testing and to 
enforce least privilege.  This 
 documentation shall also present the results of the covert  
channel analysis and the tradeoffs involved in restricting the 
channels.  All auditable events that may be used in the 
  exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be  
 identified.  The bandwidths of known covert storage channels, 
 the use of which is not detectable by the auditing mechanisms, 
 shall be provided.  (See the Covert Channel Guideline section.) 
   Hardware, firmware, and software mechanisms not dealt with in 
  the FTLS but strictly internal to the TCB (e.g., mapping 
 registers, direct memory access I/O) shall be clearly described. 
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